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I. INTRODUCTION 
Outrageousness.  Of all the standards employed in tort law (neg-
ligence, recklessness, malice, etc.), outrageousness, as part of the tort 
of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), is 
one of, if not the most difficult to define.  Attempts to define the 
concept typically involve generally unhelpful platitudes or examples 
of actions that are not outrageous.1  The Restatement (Second) of Torts’ 
explanation that “outrageous” conduct is conduct that would arouse 
the resentment of the average member of the community against the 
defendant “and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
2
 has elicited 
chuckles from first-year law students for decades. 
Compounding the difficulty is the fact that outrageousness is a 
relative concept.  Much depends on the context and the relationship 
between the parties.
3
  It is black-letter law, for example, that mere in-
sults do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
4
  But while a 
court may have little difficulty applying that rule in the case of an in-
sult or slur uttered by a stranger, a racial insult or slur directed by an 
employer at an employee might produce a different result.
5
  Ulti-
mately, the most recurring criticism of the tort is that its lack of clear 
standards with respect to the concept of “extreme and outrageous” 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.  My thanks 
to my colleagues Joe King and Paula Schaefer for their helpful comments on an ear-
lier draft.  Thanks also to Craig Finn and Tad Kubler.  
 1 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977). 
 3 See Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(“[O]utrageousness is not only highly subjective it is an extremely mutable trait.”). 
 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977). 
 5 See Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 694−95 (N.J. 1998) (concluding that a rea-
sonable juror could find racial slur uttered by a sheriff and directed at subordinate 
officer to be outrageous but that a similar slur spoken by a stranger would not quali-
fy).   
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conduct—the most important element of the tort
6
—leads to unpre-
dictable results.
7
 
Similar line-drawing difficulties emerge in IIED cases involving 
lawyers as defendants.  It is well established that mere legal malprac-
tice on the part of a lawyer, standing alone, cannot form the basis of 
an IIED claim.
8
  And in general, plaintiffs have had little success with 
their IIED claims against attorneys.
9
  But beyond these general obser-
vations, things are often less clear.  Clients and non-clients have pur-
sued IIED claims against lawyers for a wide variety of misconduct, 
ranging from trying to coerce clients into having sex,
10
 to overly-
aggressive cross-examination,
11
 to threatening criminal prosecution in 
an attempt to collect a debt.
12
  While most IIED claims against attor-
neys fail, predicting whether a particular attorney’s actions will be de-
termined to have crossed the line into “extreme and outrageous” 
conduct is sometimes at least as difficult as it is with respect to other 
defendants. 
Of course, one can argue that the outcomes of IIED cases involv-
ing attorneys are predictable in the sense that most plaintiffs lose.  
But there remains the related question of why a finding that a law-
yer’s misconduct is not extreme and outrageous should be the norm.  
Why, for example, is it that a lawyer’s willful neglect of a client matter 
rarely rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, even 
when the results of the neglect are foreseeable and/or extreme (e.g., 
losing custody of one’s child
13
 or attempted suicide
14
)?  What does it 
take for a lawyer’s conduct to be considered extreme and outrageous 
 
 6 See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Even-
handedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 42, 42–43 (1982) (stating that, in practice, the tort “tends to reduce to a sin-
gle element—the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct”). 
 7 See id. at 63 (“When the parties are not bound by contract, the cases are fewer, 
the results more unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent.”); Russell Fraker, 
Note, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic Tort of IIED, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 983, 1003 (2008) (noting the tort’s “lack of clear substantive boundaries” and 
unpredictability of borderline cases). 
 8 E.g., Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying Ten-
nessee law); Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989) (applying 
Virginia law); Caddell v. Gates, 327 S.E.2d 351, 352 (S.C. 1984).  
 9 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6:28, at 742 
(2011). 
 10 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 11 See infra notes 221–22 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 13 E.g., Thornton v. Squyres, 877 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ark. 1994). 
 14 E.g., O’Neil v. Vasseur, 796 P.2d 134, 141 (Idaho 1990). 
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for purposes of an IIED claim?  As importantly, how can a finder of 
fact make this determination in any responsible and consistent man-
ner? 
The decisional law involving IIED claims against lawyers provides 
little guidance on these questions.  IIED cases involving lawyers 
present a host of challenging issues.  The overall law governing law-
yers is replete with references to the special responsibilities lawyers 
have with respect to their clients and the legal system.  Lawyers are 
often under obligations that are in tension with each other, thus 
sometimes complicating the analysis of whether a lawyer’s conduct is 
extreme and outrageous for purposes of civil liability.  For example, 
the fact that a lawyer has, in the course of representing a client, vi-
olated the ethical duty to refrain from harassing others during the 
course of representation might cut in favor of a finding of outra-
geousness.
15
  However, the fact that the same lawyer is also under a 
duty to diligently and zealously pursue the client’s interests may cut 
against such a finding.
16
 
Unfortunately, courts tend to decide (often as a matter of law) 
whether a lawyer’s conduct is extreme and outrageous with little re-
gard for the complexities inherent in these kinds of cases.  Indeed, as 
they frequently do in IIED cases involving non-lawyers, courts tend to 
decide the issue with little reference to any but the most vague of 
standards.  This is a problem that plagues much of IIED law.  But, as 
this Article attempts to demonstrate, in the case of IIED claims 
against lawyers, the problem is especially pronounced.  Therefore, 
this Article attempts to provide some clarity by proposing an ap-
proach for evaluating lawyer conduct that relies on more objective 
indicia of outrageousness. 
This Article examines the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as applied to the conduct of lawyers engaging in the 
practice of law.
17
  Part II discusses the basic elements of the tort, with 
a particular focus on the factors and objective indicia of extreme and 
outrageous conduct that courts have sometimes relied upon in eva-
luating a defendant’s conduct.  In the case of lawyers charged with 
 
 15 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2011).  
 16 Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
 17 Excluded from the discussion are situations in which a lawyer is a defendant 
but the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct does not primarily involve the law-
yer engaging in the practice of law.  See, e.g., Brown v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 696 
N.E.2d 953, 954 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (involving a lawyer who allegedly required his 
secretary to engage in illegal acts, including forging his wife’s signature); Bevan v. 
Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 2002) (involving a claim stemming from a lawyer’s as-
sault on another). 
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the intentional infliction of emotional distress, one possible indicator 
of extreme and outrageous conduct is a violation of an ethical rule.
18
  
Therefore, Part III explores how these factors and rules might, in 
theory, apply in the case of an IIED claim against a lawyer.  The Ar-
ticle concludes, however, that sole reliance on these factors and the 
ethical rules governing lawyers will often be inadequate.  Part IV ex-
amines how courts have dealt with IIED claims brought against law-
yers by their clients as compared to the IIED claims of non-clients.  
Finally, Part V attempts to offer more concrete standards with respect 
to what qualifies as extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of a 
lawyer.  Specifically, this Part argues that in gauging the outrageous-
ness of a lawyer’s conduct, courts should expressly look to the ethical 
rules governing lawyers, the policies underlying those rules, and most 
importantly, the formal standards for imposing professional discip-
line against lawyers. 
II. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND 
INDICATORS OF EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT 
The broad contours of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress are well established.  To recover, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that the defendant, by extreme and outrageous conduct, inten-
tionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to the 
plaintiff.
19
  While formulations of the elements may vary slightly, every 
jurisdiction recognizes the tort.
20
  However, virtually every jurisdiction 
also struggles with the concept of extreme and outrageous conduct.  
The following Part describes some of the approaches courts have tak-
en with respect to defining what constitutes “extreme and outra-
geous” conduct, the most crucial element of an IIED claim. 
A. Constraints on the Tort 
The common-law rules governing the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress are designed to address tort law’s 
longstanding reluctance—based largely on concerns over excessive 
 
 18 Resort to professional standards to determine a breach of an applicable stan-
dard is hardly uncommon in tort law.  For example, physician liability in medical 
malpractice cases is determined with reference to objective standards, namely the 
professional standards governing physicians.  See Joseph H. King, The Common Know-
ledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Requirement for Establishing the Standard of Care in 
Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 51, 51 (2007). 
 19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
 20 Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom Biography and Intellec-
tual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 604 (2010). 
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litigation and fraudulent claims—to recognize liability solely for emo-
tional harm,
21
 its concerns over allowing tort law to impose liability 
for mere incivility rather than truly tortious conduct,
22
 and the need 
to preserve doctrinal clarity and distinction between existing torts.
23
  
In order to address the concerns over fakery and excessive litigation 
stemming from allowing recovery in the absence of physical harm, a 
plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress must es-
tablish that the defendant’s conduct resulted in severe emotional dis-
tress.
24
  To prevent the tort from trampling upon other torts that are 
designed to address specific wrongs, numerous jurisdictions view in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress as a “gap-filler” tort that 
cannot be used to circumvent the restrictions of another tort that 
more naturally applies to the defendant’s conduct.
25
  But perhaps the 
most important limitation on the tort is the requirement that the de-
fendant’s conduct be extreme and outrageous.
26
 
 
 21 See Givelber, supra note 6, at 57 (arguing that the tort’s constraints are based, 
in part, on the desire “to provide reliable confirmation that the plaintiff’s suffering is 
genuine and reasonable”); Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of 
Constraint, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1198–99 (2009) (discussing tort law’s histor-
ical reluctance to permit recovery for stand-alone emotional distress). 
 22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“[P]laintiffs must 
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough 
language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.”); Gi-
velber, supra note 6, at 57 (arguing that the tort’s constraints are based, in part, on 
the view that “incivility is so pervasive in our society that it is inappropriate for the law 
to attempt to provide a remedy for it in every instance”); Rabin, supra note 21, at 
1205 (explaining the constraints on IIED by reference to the need to “polic[e] the 
boundary between aberrant and acceptable social behavior”). 
 23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
45 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (noting that limitations on the tort “are es-
sential in preventing this tort from being so expansive as to intrude on important 
countervailing policies”). 
 24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); see Fraker, supra note 7, at 
1001 (noting that courts have been reluctant to expand liability under the tort due to 
concerns over excessive litigation and fraudulent claims). 
 25 See, e.g., Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. 2005) 
(“[I]ntentional infliction of emotional distress is ‘a ‘gap-filler’ tort never intended to 
supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies.”); Hoffmann-La 
Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004) (stating that the tort was 
created “for the limited purpose of allowing recovery in those rare instances in which 
a defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual 
that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress”); Fraker, supra note 7, at 
996 (noting that “in a significant minority of jurisdictions,” courts have found that 
the tort “cannot overlap with other torts or statutory wrongs”).  
 26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); Givelber, supra note 6, at 42–
43 (“[The tort] tends to reduce to a single element—the outrageousness of the de-
fendant’s conduct.”). 
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As suggested in the Introduction, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to state with precision what actions qualify as extreme and outra-
geous.
27
  The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided per-
haps the most common explanation of the term.  Comment d to sec-
tion 46 of the Restatement explains that “[l]iability has been found 
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.”
28
  Emphasizing the idea that liability is only appropriate 
in limited circumstances, the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that 
“liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”
29
 
The reality, however, is that courts frequently offer little expla-
nation for their conclusions as to why conduct is not sufficiently out-
rageous to satisfy the tort’s chief requirement.  In an observation 
noteworthy for its candor, a Florida appellate court summarized the 
approach of Florida courts in addressing the outrageousness element: 
The appellate courts of Florida have developed an almost “form” 
opinion for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims: (1) 
brief recitation of the facts; (2) quotation of Restatement com-
ment d; (3) pronouncement that the conduct does not meet the 
Restatement test of atrociousness, utter intolerability, passing all 
bounds of decency and impulsion to exclaim “outrageous!”
30
 
Although limited to Florida courts, the court’s observation applies 
with equal force to most jurisdictions. 
B. Indicators of Outrageousness 
Although the question of whether a defendant’s conduct is ex-
treme and outrageous is intensely fact-specific, certain indicators of 
outrageousness have developed over time.  According to the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts, these indicators include “the relationship of the 
parties, whether the actor abused a position of authority over the 
other person, whether the other person was especially vulnerable and 
the actor knew of the vulnerability, the motivation of the actor, and 
 
 27 See Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 cmt. c 
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“Specific rules for when conduct is extreme and out-
rageous cannot be stated, nor can categories of conduct be identified for formula-
tion into universal rules.”); Givelber, supra note 6, at 42 (noting the “extraordinary 
lack of defined standards” regarding what qualifies as outrageous conduct). 
 28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Lashley, 561 So. 2d at 409. 
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whether the conduct was repeated or prolonged.”
31
  Regarding the 
relationship of the parties, a relationship of trust—such as that of 
doctor and patient—may be sufficiently special to establish a lower 
standard of outrageousness.
32
  But even where a relationship of such 
heightened trust does not exist, any relationship that tort law treats as 
“special” enough to impose a heightened duty on the defendant—
such as innkeeper and guest—may also make it easier for a plaintiff 
to establish that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outra-
geous.
33
  Similarly, while insults are generally not considered extreme 
and outrageous, the existence of a special relationship may lead a 
court to conclude that the insult is actionable.
34
 
Closely related to the idea that a special relationship may help 
render conduct extreme and outrageous is the notion that conduct 
may be actionable where the defendant holds a position of authority 
over the plaintiff and abuses that position.
35
  This would also include 
the situation where the defendant’s position provides the defendant 
with actual or apparent authority over the plaintiff, or the power to 
affect the plaintiff’s interests.
36
  Most of the other indicators of ex-
treme and outrageous conduct—such as the defendant’s knowledge 
that the plaintiff was especially vulnerable—are easily understood. 
 
 31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).  One author lists four main categories of con-
duct supporting a finding of outrageous conduct: 
(1) [A]busing a position of power; (2) emotionally harming a plaintiff 
known to be especially vulnerable; (3) repeating or continuing conduct 
that may be tolerable when committed once but becomes intolerable 
when committed numerous times; and (4) committing or threatening 
violence or serious economic harm to a person or property in which 
the plaintiff is known to have a special interest. 
John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. 
REV. 789, 803 (2007). 
 32 See McQuay v. Gunthorp, 986 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Ark. 1999) (taking into account 
the trust a patient places in a doctor in assessing outrageousness of defendant-
doctor’s conduct). 
 33 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 1224, 1230 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(noting special relationship of shipper and common carrier in concluding that de-
fendant’s conduct could be considered sufficiently extreme and outrageous for pur-
poses of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). 
 34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965); see also Brown v. Man-
ning, 764 F. Supp. 183, 187 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (concluding that special relationship 
between insurer and insured helped render defendant’s obscene statements extreme 
and outrageous); Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 n.21 (D.C. 1980) (citing 
examples of common carrier, innkeeper, or public utility as situations in which in-
sults may become actionable). 
 35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).   
 36 Id. 
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Although these indicators of outrageousness provide courts with 
some guidance, they have not led to predictable outcomes in IIED 
cases.  The indicators, although simple enough on their face, are sub-
ject to any number of countervailing concerns in a given case.  For 
example, an employer occupies a position of authority over an em-
ployee.  Thus, at first glance, it would seem that employees alleging 
IIED against their employers—either for the fact of their firing or for 
the abuse they endured while employed—would have a relatively 
high success rate.  Yet, the opposite is generally true.
37
  The employ-
ment at-will rule, which, is subject to numerous exceptions, provides 
employers with the right to discharge their employees at any time, for 
any reason, has largely shielded employers from IIED claims based 
upon the fact of a firing.
38
  And while it is certainly possible that an 
employer’s abusive treatment of an employee during an employment 
relationship might rise to the level of extreme and outrageous beha-
vior, the at-will employment rule provides courts with a ready re-
sponse to such claims: the at-will rule is designed to preserve man-
agement prerogative, and inherent in that concept is the notion that 
management must be given wide latitude in running their workplaces 
as they see fit, even if it means foreseeable emotional distress on the 
part of employees.
39
 
 
 37 See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional In-
fliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1988) (summarizing case law); 
William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. 
L. REV. 91, 110 (2003) (noting that employees who have sued their employers for 
IIED have generally fared poorly); see also Hollomon v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413, 417 
(Ark. 1996) (taking a “strict view in recognizing a claim for the tort of outrage in 
employment-relationship[s]”). 
 38 See, e.g., Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1987) (“Mere 
discharge from employment does not constitute outrageous or intolerable conduct 
by an employer.”); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration From 
Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2181 (2007) (“[The tort] is not 
intended to change the at-will employment doctrine or interfere with management’s 
prerogative to terminate [at-will] employees.”); Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of 
the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 
1697 (1996) (“[A]n at-will employee implicitly submits to being terminated without 
notice or cause and so cannot claim that such conduct against him is outrageous.”). 
 39 See Austin, supra note 37, at 8 (“The courts accord employers wide latitude in 
directing their employees’ activities in ways that cause them emotional distress.”); 
Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The 
Case Against the “Tortification” of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 422 
(1994) (“[T]he goal of such torts, as applied, is to attack the employer’s decision 
making . . . .”).  One of the most commonly-discussed issues in recent years is the 
ability of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims to address the problem of 
“workplace bullying,” with many commentators questioning the tort’s effectiveness in 
this regard.  See Corbett, supra note 37, at 119–22 (discussing the increased attention 
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C. Objective Indicia of Outrageous Conduct 
The list of indicators provided in the Restatement (Third) of Torts is 
not exhaustive. Extortionate conduct, for example, may satisfy the 
outrageousness requirement.
40
  The central problem in defining out-
rageous conduct, however, is that there are relatively few reliable, ob-
jective indicators of such conduct.
41
  In deciding whether a plaintiff’s 
case is strong enough to withstand summary judgment, courts must 
draw their own conclusions as to whether a defendant’s conduct is 
within the bounds of social acceptability.  Yet, as Professor Daniel Gi-
velber argued nearly thirty years ago, this is an exceptionally difficult 
task.  There is no reason to believe that judges are particularly adept 
at divining the public’s sense of what is socially tolerable.
42
  This may 
be because judges are not particularly tuned in to prevailing societal 
norms of acceptable conduct or because there is disagreement within 
the community as to what the norm is.
43
  Regardless, judges often 
have little to go on when deciding whether there is a genuine issue of 
fact concerning the issue.  Finally, judges may have difficulty in decid-
ing whether a defendant’s conduct is “utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community” because there is disagreement on the question between 
the community of which the defendant is a member (e.g., the busi-
ness community or medical profession) and the broader community 
as a whole.
44
 
That said, if one is seeking to determine whether the relevant 
community considers a particular act intolerable, there may be at 
least some objective indicators that are potentially relevant.  For ex-
ample, the fact that a defendant’s conduct offends some well-
established and clearly-defined public policy should logically factor 
into assessing whether the conduct is so transgressive of community 
standards as to be extreme and outrageous.  Indeed, as discussed be-
low, some courts have explicitly relied on statements of public policy 
in helping to make the outrageousness determination. 
 
being devoted to workplace bullying and the ability of IIED claims to address the 
problem).    
 40 See, e.g., Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 41 See Duffy, supra note 39, at 422 (“[A]nalysis of outrageousness in a given case 
depends not on concrete standards . . . but, instead, upon the court’s own response 
to what it considers to be particularly egregious facts.”); Givelber, supra note 6, at 56 
(noting the lack of “external standards for outrageousness”). 
 42 Givelber, supra note 6, at 52. 
 43 Id. at 53. 
 44 Id.  
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1. The General Role of Public Policy in the 
Outrageousness Determination 
“Public policy” is a concept almost as elusive as outrageousness.  
However, courts have frequently relied on the fact that a defendant’s 
actions somehow offended public policy in considering questions of 
liability.  Where, for example, a court concludes that a contractual 
provision offends public policy, the provision may be unenforceable 
on that basis.
45
 
In assessing whether a defendant’s actions offend public policy, 
courts typically look to positive expressions of public policy contained 
in constitutional or statutory provisions.
46
  Courts also sometimes look 
to other sources of public policy, such as administrative regulations.
47
  
Others have been willing to conclude that at least some professional 
standards of conduct may be reliable indicators of public policy.
48
 
In the tort context, most courts have been willing to conclude 
that public policy may limit an employer’s ability to discharge an em-
ployee.  The tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
represents an exception to the default rule of employment at-will.  
Thus, where an employer’s discharge of an employee threatens sub-
stantial public policy—for example, where an employer fires an em-
ployee for performing jury duty—the employee may have a remedy in 
tort.
49
 
Similarly, several courts have expressed the idea that conduct 
that violates public policy may constitute extreme and outrageous 
conduct for purposes of an IIED claim.
50
  For example, in Macey v. 
New York State Electric & Gas Corp., a New York case, the plaintiff al-
 
 45 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981); Alex B. Long, 
Attorney-Client Fee Agreements that Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REV. 287, 291 (2009). 
 46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) cmt. a (1981). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Post v. Bregman, 707 A.2d 806, 818 (Md. 1998) (concluding that Maryland 
disciplinary rule governing fee-sharing agreements between lawyers articulates a pub-
lic policy and refusing to enforce an agreement that violated rule). 
 49 See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975). 
 50 Leone v. New England Commc’ns, No. CV010509752S, 2002 WL 1008470 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 
1984); Macey v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 436 N.Y.S.2d 389, 391-92 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1981); see also Sethi v. Yaglidere, No. CV044003034S, 2009 WL 2963283, at 
*13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2009) (considering the “strong public policy ex-
pressed by statute in our state, dating to colonial times, prohibiting illegal entry and 
detainer” in evaluating whether defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous); 
Myers v. Hot Bagels Factory, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1076–77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) 
(stating that Ohio recognizes two versions of IIED, the second of which is “premised 
on public policy”).  
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leged that a public utility refused to restore power to the plaintiff un-
til she separated from her husband.
51
  There is a longstanding and 
well-recognized policy against encouraging the dissolution of mar-
riage.
52
  Thus, according to the court, if the plaintiff’s allegations were 
true, the defendant’s actions would offend public policy and could 
also amount to extreme and outrageous conduct.
53
 
2. Statutes as Indicia of Outrageousness 
Courts have also sometimes taken into account the fact that a 
defendant’s actions violate a statute in deciding whether a jury ques-
tion exists on the outrageousness issue.
54
  The fact that a legislature 
views a problem as being substantial enough to warrant a legislative 
solution provides at least some indication that the defendant’s inten-
tional conduct in violation of the statute is socially intolerable.  One 
obvious example would be employment discrimination statutes, such 
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
55
  These statutes “represent 
the social judgment that racism in the workplace is a profound social 
evil.”
56
  Thus, for example, in Howard University v. Best, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals pointed to the fact that the defendant’s 
repeated instances of sexual harassment violated public policy, as ar-
ticulated in the D.C. Human Rights Act, in concluding that the de-
fendant’s conduct could be considered extreme and outrageous for 
purposes of an IIED claim.
57
 
 
 51 Macey, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 391–92. 
 52 See Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn. 1956). 
 53 Macey, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 391–92. 
 54 See Sethi, 2009 WL 2963283, at *13 (considering the “strong public policy ex-
pressed by statute in our state, dating to colonial times, prohibiting illegal entry and 
detainer” in evaluating whether defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous); 
Givelber, supra note 6, at 65. 
 55 See, e.g., McCurdy v. Dillon, 98 N.W. 746, 748 (Mich. 1904) (stating that 
“[p]ublic policy is interested in maintaining the family relation” and refusing to en-
force an agreement giving a lawyer a contingent fee in a divorce case). 
 56 Givelber, supra note 6, at 66.  Title VII prohibits other forms of discrimination 
as well, including sex-based discrimination.  To be clear, there is nothing approach-
ing uniformity in the courts’ approaches in these types of cases.  Some courts have 
concluded that IIED claims that essentially amount to unlawful harassment are 
preempted by state civil rights statutes or the exclusivity provisions of workers’ com-
pensation statutes.  Chamallas, supra note 38, at 2136–38.  Other courts, perhaps at-
tempting to preserve the distinction between statutory and tort theories involving the 
workplace, have seemingly required IIED plaintiffs to show “something more than 
discrimination or even persistent harassment to establish outrageousness in the em-
ployment context.”  Id. at 2131. 
 57 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984); see also Leone v. New England Commc’ns, No. 
CV010509752S, 2002 WL 1008470, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002) (stating 
that “there is a strong public policy expressed by statute in our state prohibiting dis-
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Similarly, in Lawrence v. Leech, a Tennessee case, the defendant-
veterinarian was accused of intentionally inflicting emotional distress 
upon the plaintiff by threatening to “do away with” the plaintiff’s dog 
unless the plaintiff’s bill was paid in full.
58
  The veterinarian sought 
refuge in a state statute dealing with such situations.
59
  Specifically, 
the statute authorized a veterinarian to turn over an animal to the 
humane society for disposal if the veterinarian provided written no-
tice ten days in advance to the owner of the animal.
60
  In Lawrence, the 
veterinarian argued that his threat was not extreme and outrageous 
because he had substantially complied with the requirements of the 
statute.
61
  However, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that sub-
stantial compliance is not actual compliance and that “[t]he statute 
[could] afford no shelter to the defendants in this particular case be-
cause the threats to do away with the animal” were not authorized by 
the statute.
62
  Accordingly, the court concluded that a reasonable ju-
ror could find the defendant’s conduct to be extreme and outra-
geous.
63
 
Of course, not every legislative enactment reflects the same type 
of clear social judgment.  Enactments that are mainly technical in na-
ture, for example, are unlikely to be reliable indicators of accepted 
social norms.
64
  Similarly, even where the statute in question articu-
lates a substantial public policy (such as in the case of anti-
discrimination statutes), not every violation of a statute amounts to 
extreme and outrageous conduct.
65
  For example, disability discrimi-
nation sometimes involves seemingly benign stereotypical assump-
tions about individuals with disabilities.  Indeed, the discriminator 
may believe he or she is acting in the best interests of an individual 
with a disability in enacting some overly protective rule that excludes 
 
crimination on the basis of race, sex or national origin” and concluding that employ-
er who made repeated racial slurs engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct). 
 58 655 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tenn. 1983). 
 59 Id. at 928. 
 60 Id. at 931. 
 61 Id. at 929. 
 62 Id. at 930. 
 63 Id. 
 64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 180 cmt. a (1981). 
 65 See Hoffman v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(concluding that defendant’s age discrimination in violation of D.C. Human Rights 
Act was not outrageous); Sethi v. Yaglidere, No. CV044003034S, 2009 WL 2963283, at 
*13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2009) (concluding that defendant’s actions were not 
outrageous despite the violation of statute expressing strong public policy). 
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the individual.
66
  These forms of discrimination are, of course, illegal 
and therefore intolerable; however, perhaps they are not “utterly into-
lerable” in the same way as, say, repeated instances of harassment or 
abusive behavior on the basis of disability.
67
  At a minimum, however, 
where a statute provides a reliable indicator of a societal judgment 
about the wrongfulness of a defendant’s actions, reliance on the sta-
tute by courts and juries in aiding the outrageousness determination 
seems appropriate in an area that cries out for some predictable 
standards. 
 
3. Violation of Professional or Ethical Standards as Indicia 
of Outrageousness 
Courts have also occasionally looked to relevant professional or 
ethical standards in determining whether a defendant’s conduct was 
extreme and outrageous.  In several cases involving physicians as de-
fendants, the fact that the defendants’ conduct complied with the 
standards of the medical profession led the courts to conclude that 
the defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous.
68
  In other 
instances, courts have pointed to a defendant’s failure to conform his 
or her conduct to applicable professional standards as being a rele-
vant consideration in the outrageousness analysis.
69
  For example, in 
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., a federal court in New York concluded 
that the fact that the defendant violated numerous self-enforced pro-
fessional standards of the journalism field was relevant for purposes 
of determining whether the defendant’s conduct was extreme and 
 
 66 See Jeanette Cox, Crossroads & Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 
IND. L.J. 187, 198 (2010) (explaining that the text and legislative history of the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act expresses a belief that paternalistic attitudes and overpro-
tective rules are a form of discrimination). 
 67 See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1079, 1120 (2002) (“Harassing conduct inflicted on an individual relating to the 
individual’s disability is clearly included in the [intentional infliction of emotional 
distress] tort, as long as the conduct and the harm reach the requisite level of severi-
ty.”). 
 68 See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 209 (Alaska 1995) (finding that doc-
tor’s actions were not extreme and outrageous where actions conformed to applica-
ble professional standards); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622–23 (Tenn. 1997) 
(concluding that because defendants’ conduct did not violate applicable medical 
standards, it could not be regarded as extreme and outrageous).  
 69 See Cawood v. Booth, No. E2007-02537-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4998408, at *10 
n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008) (“In determining whether the complained of 
conduct rises to the requisite level, the fact finder is allowed to consider the relevant 
professional or ethical standards governing a particular group or community.”). 
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outrageous.
70
  The court concluded that although “unethical con-
duct, by itself, does not necessarily equate to outrageous conduct,” 
the failure to abide by relevant professional standards may be rele-
vant on the question of outrageousness.
71
 
In some instances, a violation of a professional standard may be 
an indicator that the conduct exceeds broader notions of acceptable 
behavior.  Professional standards and ethics codes sometimes provide 
clear statements as to what forms of misconduct are impermissible 
within a defined context.
72
  In many instances, professional codes of 
conduct develop precisely because the profession recognizes that the 
actions of its members may have adverse consequences on the public 
interest and the broader community.
73
 
This of course does not mean that every violation of a profes-
sional standard amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct.  For 
example, some ethical standards create a strict liability or negligence 
standard;
74
 thus, a defendant’s innocent or negligent violation would 
be fairly weak evidence of outrageous conduct.
75
  But, again, to the 
extent a standard defines inappropriate behavior by reference to an 
important underlying policy consideration, formalized standards and 
rules of professional conduct may potentially aid in the determina-
tion of the outrageousness of a defendant’s conduct. 
Moreover, in some ways, resort to professional codes of conduct 
in assessing outrageousness creates fewer potential problems for 
courts than reliance on discrimination statutes and similar legislative 
enactments.  In the latter instances, courts have had to wrestle with 
the question of whether to recognize a common law IIED claim 
 
 70 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).     
 71 Id.  But see Keates v. City of Vancouver, 869 P.2d 88, 92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) 
(concluding that expert’s opinion that defendant’s actions “were so lacking in the 
expected professional standard of care as to be callously outrageous” did not create a 
triable issue because opinion amounted to a legal conclusion). 
 72 See Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2001) 
(stating that the trend of ethics codes has been “away from broad standards and to-
ward clearly defined rules”). 
 73 See generally Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 
(Colo. 1996) (“[I]n order to qualify as public policy, the ethical provision [of a pro-
fessional code of ethics] must be designed to serve the interests of the public rather 
than the interests of the profession.”); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 
512 (N.J. 1980) (stating that a professional code of ethics “designed to serve only the 
interests of the profession” is not sufficient to qualify as an expression of public poli-
cy).   
 74 See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 34 (2010) (discussing whether a negligence or strict liability stan-
dard applies to a lawyer’s duty to maintain client confidentiality). 
 75 Nor would it satisfy the tort’s intent or recklessness requirement. 
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where recovery might also be possible under a statute.
76
  In other 
words, where a claim could sound in tort or statute, courts have had 
to decide whether to treat IIED as a gap-filler tort, to be permitted 
only where a plaintiff has no other remedy, or as a free-standing tort 
that can serve as a compliment to an existing theory of recovery.
77
  
Resort to a voluntarily-adopted professional code of ethics does not 
involve this same problem.  While a member of a profession may be 
subject to professional discipline for violation of an applicable ethical 
provision, professional ethics codes do not and cannot, standing 
alone, create a remedy for an aggrieved party.
78
  Thus, courts can look 
to such codes in judging the outrageousness of a defendant’s conduct 
without worrying about creating overlapping remedies and theories 
of recovery while also undermining the policy choices underlying an 
existing statute or tort theory. 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE RULES REGARDING INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO THE SPECIAL CASE OF LAWYER 
MISCONDUCT 
In light of the numerous positive expressions of what constitutes 
impermissible attorney behavior, one might assume that the resolu-
tion of IIED claims against lawyers would be more predictable.  How-
ever, tort law has long had difficulty dealing with the special case of 
lawyer liability.  Thus, if anything, the fact that the defendant is a law-
yer in many cases tends to complicate the resolution of IIED claims. 
A. For Outrageousness 
Several of the well-established indicators of outrageousness 
would seem, at first glance, to cut in favor of a finding of outrageous-
ness in the case of a lawyer charged with intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  First, the law governing lawyers is replete with 
references to the special nature of the attorney-client relationship.
79
  
Lawyers occupy a position of special trust and confidence with re-
spect to their clients and their duty is one of “uberrima fides”—one of 
“most abundant good faith, requiring absolute and perfect candor, 
openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment or de-
 
 76 See supra text accompanying note 54. 
 77 See Gergen, supra note 38, at 1697 (suggesting that the IIED tort should “dis-
appear in the shadow of other, more specific doctrines in contract or tort law”). 
 78 Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 837 (R.I. 1997). 
 79 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 8, intro. 
note (2000) (noting the special relationship between lawyers and clients). 
LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2012  6:07 PM 
70 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:55 
ception.”
80
  Many of the conflict of interest rules are premised on the 
notion that a client is entitled to view his or her lawyer as the client’s 
“advocate and champion” and would feel a particular sense of betray-
al if the lawyer represented a party with adverse interests, even in a 
completely unrelated matter.
81
  Therefore, at least in the case of a 
client’s IIED claim against his or her lawyer, conduct that might not 
otherwise be considered extreme and outrageous may rise to that lev-
el based on the special relationship between lawyer and client. 
A lawyer may also be in a position to know of a client’s particular 
vulnerability, thus potentially making it easier for a plaintiff to satisfy 
the extreme and outrageous conduct requirement.
82
  For example, 
the disciplinary rules governing solicitation of clients known to be in 
need of legal services are premised, in part, on the notion that such 
individuals are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to overreach-
ing on the part of unscrupulous lawyers.
83
  In many instances, lawyers 
can be assumed to be aware of a client’s emotionally vulnerable 
state,
84
 thus potentially rendering their conduct outrageous where it 
otherwise might not be. 
Even when an IIED plaintiff is an adversary and not a client, the 
fact that the defendant-lawyer has violated an ethical rule may be an 
indicator of outrageous conduct.
85
  Unlike most IIED defendants, 
lawyers are subject to a professional code of ethics and are subject to 
professional discipline for their violations thereof.  And unlike many 
professional ethics codes, the ethical rules governing lawyers are 
technically promulgated and enforced by a state’s highest court, a co-
equal branch of government.
86
  Thus, lawyer disciplinary rules possess 
 
 80 Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. 2002). 
 81 See Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964) (stating that a 
client is “entitled to feel that . . . he has the undivided loyalty of the [attorney] upon 
whom he looks as his advocate and his champion”). 
 82 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 83 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 (1978) (“The substantive 
evils of solicitation have been stated over the years in sweeping terms: stirring up liti-
gation, assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential 
harm to the solicited client in the form of overreaching, overcharging, underrepre-
sentation, and misrepresentation.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 1 
(2011) (noting that a prospective client “may already feel overwhelmed by the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the need for legal services” and that special rules are 
needed in such cases because “[t]he situation is fraught with the possibility of undue 
influence, intimidation, and over-reaching”). 
 84 See In re Witherspoon, 3 A.3d 496, 506 (N.J. 2010) (“Most clients are under 
stress and feel vulnerable when consulting with counsel . . . .”). 
 85 See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text. 
 86 Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1043, 1081–82 (2008). 
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statute-like qualities that many other professional codes do not.  Fi-
nally, most of the specific rules contained in lawyer disciplinary codes 
are not technical in nature or designed solely to protect the narrow 
interests of the legal profession.  Instead, the disciplinary process is 
designed to further the administration of justice and protect the pub-
lic’s interest in a competent and ethical legal profession.
87
  Ultimately, 
lawyer ethics codes frequently impose heightened standards of con-
duct in order to protect the public’s interest. 
As a result, most courts have been willing to recognize that at 
least some of the rules contained in lawyer ethics codes are expres-
sions of public policy.
88
  Accordingly, a lawyer who violates an ethical 
rule governing the formation of a fee agreement with a client may, as 
a matter of contract law, be unable to enforce the agreement on the 
grounds that the agreement offends public policy.
89
  A lawyer’s viola-
tion of a disciplinary rule may have implications for a tort claim 
grounded upon the violation of public policy.  Courts have been will-
ing to afford a remedy to lawyers who have been discharged by their 
law firms for attempting to comply with their legal obligations on the 
theory that such a discharge offends public policy.
90
 
A lawyer’s violation of an ethical rule may have other implica-
tions in the tort context.  Although it is well-established that a law-
yer’s violation of an ethical rule does not, by itself, provide a tort re-
medy for an aggrieved party, the Scope preceding the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) Model Rules notes that “since the Rules do estab-
lish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may 
be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.”
91
  The 
most obvious example would be where a plaintiff introduces evidence 
of a lawyer’s breach of a disciplinary rule as evidence of the lawyer’s 
negligence in a malpractice action.
92
  However, courts also sometimes 
point to a lawyer’s violation of a disciplinary rule in assessing whether 
the lawyer should be subject to liability under some other tort theory, 
such as fraud.
93
 
 
 87 See Lawyer Disciplinary Process v. Artimez, 540 S.E.2d 156, 164–65 (W. Va. 
2000) (“The principle purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to safeguard 
the public’s interest in the administration of justice.”) (citations omitted). 
 88 Long, supra note 86, at 1065. 
 89 See Long, supra note 45, at 301–21 (discussing examples). 
 90 See Long, supra note 86, at 1049–62 (discussing examples). 
 91 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 20 (2011). 
 92 See Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985) (stating that 
violation of disciplinary rule may constitute some evidence of negligence). 
 93 See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bell, 643 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ind. 1994) (referencing discip-
linary rule regarding fraud); Alex B. Long, Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professio-
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In at least some cases, a lawyer’s violation of an applicable ethical 
rule would seem likely to tip the balance in favor of a finding of out-
rageousness.  Logically, this would be most likely where the lawyer has 
violated a duty lying at the core of what it means to be a lawyer, such 
as the lawyer’s duties of loyalty and confidentiality.  However, a viola-
tion of an ethical rule could, in theory, also help a non-client estab-
lish the outrageousness requirement.  At least some ethical rules es-
tablish duties to non-clients that involve conduct that could quite 
naturally form the basis of an IIED claim.  This includes the rules 
prohibiting the destruction or alteration of evidence and the rule 
prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct having no purpose 
other than to harass or intimidate another individual.
94
  Thus, the fact 
that a lawyer—an officer of the court upon whom the law and the le-
gal profession impose special obligations
95
—engages in misconduct 
that adversely impacts non-clients could, in theory, potentially be an 
indicator of outrageousness for purposes of an IIED claim. 
B. Against Outrageousness 
At the same time, there are several potential objections to rely-
ing on the standards contained in lawyer ethics codes as indicators of 
outrageousness for purposes of IIED claims.  More broadly, there are 
several potential objections to expanding lawyer tort liability in gen-
eral and expanding liability for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress in particular.  These include concerns over the impact on 
zealous advocacy and permitting recovery for emotional distress. 
1. Violation of a Disciplinary Rule as an Indicator of 
Outrageousness 
The Model Rules observe that a lawyer’s violation of an ethical 
rule may be evidence of the lawyer’s breach of an applicable standard 
of conduct.
96
  However, some courts have been reluctant to allow evi-
dence of a lawyer’s ethical violation to serve any role in tort litiga-
tion.
97
  Even where a court is willing to consider evidence of a lawyer’s 
ethical violation, there remains the problem of when a violation is re-
 
nalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 
420–28 (2010) (discussing disciplinary rules of potential relevance in a fraud or de-
ceit action). 
 94 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a), 4.4(a) (2011). 
 95 Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, 903 N.E.2d 265, 269 (N.Y. 2009). 
 96 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 97 See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
175–76 (2010) (discussing the use of rules of professional conduct in malpractice ac-
tions). 
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levant to the question of whether the lawyer’s conduct was extreme 
and outrageous. 
Some rules, such as the rule articulating a lawyer’s duty to main-
tain client confidentiality, speak to deeply-held principles of the legal 
profession.
98
  At first glance, a violation of a rule that is fundamental 
to the administration of justice and the legal profession’s values 
would seem to provide strong evidence of outrageousness on a law-
yer’s part.  However, Model Rule 1.6(a)—the rule that articulates a 
lawyer’s duty not to reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client—is arguably a strict liability rule.
99
  At most, the rule re-
quires mere negligence on a lawyer’s part before there is a viola-
tion.
100
  In contrast, the concept of outrageous conduct implies will-
fulness, amounting to an extreme departure from relevant standards.  
Although it is certainly conceivable that a lawyer’s reckless disregard 
of client confidentiality could amount to outrageous conduct, the 
negligent or innocent violation of Rule 1.6(a) is not the kind of ex-
treme conduct the Restatement (Second) of Torts contemplates.
101
 
Other ethical rules establish important prohibitions on lawyer 
misconduct.  However, some of these standards address garden-
variety misconduct, which would not, in the typical case, rise to the 
level of extreme and outrageous conduct.  For example, the fact that 
a lawyer violates the ethical prohibition on dishonest conduct
102
 might 
have some relevance on the question of outrageousness.  However, if 
the violation occurred in the course of the lawyer’s private rather 
 
 98 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011). 
 99 See Moore, supra note74, at 34 (discussing this issue). 
 100 See id. (discussing this issue and concluding that a negligence standard should 
apply). 
 101 A lawyer’s intentional or reckless violation of a fundamental duty owed to a 
client would logically provide a stronger indicator of extreme and outrageous con-
duct.  However, in some cases a client may already have a remedy for such miscon-
duct in the form of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.  See Pietro v. Sacks, No. B208953, 
2010 WL 298240, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2010) (involving breach of fiduciary 
duty claim based on lawyer’s alleged threat to disclose confidential information in 
order to prevent client from terminating representation); Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 
822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (involving breach of fiduciary duty and IIED 
claims based on lawyer’s disclosure of confidential information to district attorney).  
In a jurisdiction that views IIED as a gap-filler tort that can only be asserted where no 
other theory of recovery would permit recovery, a lawyer’s intentional or reckless vi-
olation of a fiduciary duty enshrined in an ethical rule may mean that a client cannot 
proceed on an IIED claim. 
 102 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2011). 
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than professional life, there would be little reason to view the lawyer’s 
dishonesty as any more outrageous than a non-lawyer’s dishonesty.
103
 
In contrast, a lawyer’s violation of the ethical rule prohibiting 
false statements of material fact to another person while in the course 
of representing a client might have greater relevance on the question of 
outrageousness due to the fact that the lawyer’s actions interfere with 
the administration of justice and undermine respect for the legal 
process.
104
  Even in this situation, however, a violation of this ethical 
rule may have limited value in terms of establishing the outrageous-
ness of a lawyer’s conduct.  For example, a violation of the ethical 
rule regarding competence tends to carry considerable weight in a 
malpractice action in terms of establishing the lawyer’s breach of the 
duty of care owed to a client.
105
  But false statements of material facts 
come in all shapes and sizes, only some of which amount to conduct 
utterly intolerable in a civilized society.  Indeed, a comment to the re-
levant Model Rule notes that the making of false statements of ma-
terial fact in the course of representing a client is, in some limited 
circumstances, actually permissible, despite the literal language of the 
ethical rule prohibiting such conduct.
106
  Not surprisingly then, plain-
tiffs have had little success arguing that a violation of a disciplinary 
rule is, per se, extreme and outrageous conduct.
107
 
2. Zealous Advocacy Concerns 
There are also more general concerns about expanding lawyer 
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Chief among 
them is the concern that expanded liability might have an adverse 
impact on the duty of zealous advocacy.  One of the most cherished 
values of the legal profession is the notion of a lawyer’s duty of zeal-
ous advocacy on behalf of a client.
108
  Although numerous commenta-
 
 103 Numerous courts have concluded that “conduct by an attorney arising in the 
attorney’s other, non-professional pursuits is also a proper subject of disciplinary 
proceedings.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shaw, 732 A.2d 876, 885 (Md. 1999). 
 104 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 4.1(a) (2011) (prohibiting false state-
ments of material fact in the course of representing a client). 
 105 See Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985) (citing Woo-
druff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980)) (stating that evidence of a violation of 
a disciplinary rule constitutes “rebuttable evidence of legal malpractice”). 
 106 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 4.1 cmt. 2 (2011) (stating that certain 
types of statements, such as statements regarding a party’s intentions as to an accept-
able settlement, are not treated as statements of fact for purposes of rule). 
 107 Nestlerode v. Fed. Ins. Co., 414 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. Div. 1979).  
 108 See Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 
EMORY L.J. 467, 470 (1992) (listing zealous advocacy as one of the central compo-
nents of professionalism) (citing Monroe H. Freedman, The Golden Age of Law 
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tors have criticized the tendency of lawyers to use the idea of zealous 
advocacy as a shibboleth for dishonest and unethical behavior, the 
value of zealous advocacy on behalf of a client remains deeply em-
bedded in the collective psyche of the legal profession.
109
 
The commitment to ensuring that lawyers are able and willing to 
act as zealous advocates on behalf of their clients is also deeply em-
bedded in tort law.  For example, a lawyer who is participating in a 
judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory ma-
terial concerning another, provided the communication has some re-
lation to the proceeding.
110
  This litigator’s privilege is designed to en-
sure that lawyers are not dissuaded from acting zealously on behalf of 
clients for fear of facing civil liability.
111
  For this reason, the privilege 
is absolute in nature.
112
  The litigator’s privilege is also far reaching.  
Although originally developed in the defamation context, the privi-
lege has been extended in some jurisdictions to reach a variety of liti-
gation-related torts, including malicious prosecution and even misre-
presentation.
113
 
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers expresses a similar 
theme in the context of IIED claims.  A comment to section 56 em-
phasizes that “[v]igorous advocacy is important in adversary proceed-
ings.”
114
  Consequently, “a lawyer’s partisanship in presenting evi-
dence and argument, drafting and serving pleadings, and comparably 
pressing a client’s case in such a proceeding is not considered ex-
treme and outrageous and is privileged from [IIED] liability to the 
opposing party.”
115
 
The concern over the impact of expanded tort liability on a law-
yer’s duty of zealous advocacy also manifests itself in tort law’s tradi-
tional refusal to recognize that a lawyer owes a duty of care to a non-
client.  Although there are exceptions, the general rule is that a law-
 
That Never Was, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, reprinted in THE LAWYER AS PROFESSIONAL 
(T.W. Floyd & W.F. Newton eds., 1991)). 
 109 See generally Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The ‘Z’ Words and Other 
Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 568–70 
(2002) (criticizing lawyers’ reliance on the value of zealous advocacy to justify unpro-
fessional behavior). 
 110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 585 (1977). 
 111 See id. § 586 cmt. a (stating that the privilege “is based upon a public policy of 
securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to 
secure justice for their clients”). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Long, supra note 93, at 433. 
 114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. g (2000). 
 115 Id. 
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yer does not owe a duty to a non-client.
116
  This is particularly true in 
the case of adversarial parties.
117
  Part of the rationale for the reluc-
tance to impose civil liability against lawyers for conduct that harms 
non-parties is that it would place lawyers in the position of owing con-
flicting duties to clients and non-clients.
118
  Although this no-duty rule 
is cited most commonly in negligence cases, the rule and its rationale 
also sometimes find their way into the courts’ analyses of intentional 
tort claims against lawyers.
119
 
3. The Reluctance to Permit Recovery for Emotional 
Distress 
A final concern about expanding lawyer liability for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is that it would conflict with tort law’s 
longstanding reluctance to permit recovery for emotional distress 
damages against lawyers.  As a general matter, tort law has long ex-
pressed reluctance to permit recovery for emotional distress unac-
companied by any physical harm.
120
  For example, some jurisdictions 
require that the emotional distress be “manifested by objective symp-
tomatology and substantiated by expert medical testimony.”
121
 
This reluctance also happens to coincide with the majority rule 
prohibiting plaintiffs from recovering emotional distress damages in 
attorney malpractice actions.
122
  The limitation is based primarily on 
the notion that emotional distress resulting from a lawyer’s mishan-
dling of a matter is not foreseeable.
123
  Courts have noted that “a citi-
zen’s encounter with the legal process is a source of great anxiety” 
even under the best of circumstances and even if represented by the 
best of counsel.
124
  The rule is also based in part on the fear that law-
yers would be subjected to a barrage of lawsuits from disgruntled 
clients should emotional distress damages be permitted.
125
  In addi-
 
 116 Id. § 51. 
 117 See Long, supra note 93, at 431.  
 118 See id. at 432 (stating that courts frequently justify the rule on grounds that a 
contrary rule might result in decreased loyalty to a client). 
 119 Id. 
 120 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 121 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982). 
 122 See Wehringer v. Powers & Hall, P.C., 874 F. Supp. 425, 429 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(predicting that Massachusetts courts would hold that recovery is only permitted in 
exceptional circumstances); 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 9, § 21:11, at 38. 
 123 Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the “Cap-
tured” Regulators of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 478–79 (2002). 
 124 Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (Miss. 1991). 
 125 Id. at 479; Kessler, supra note 123, at 479. 
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tion to generalized worries over excessive litigation, the particular 
concern in allowing excessive litigation against lawyers is that it will 
have an adverse effect on the willingness of lawyers to serve as zealous 
advocates for their clients.  Thus, regardless of whether a plaintiff’s 
claim against a lawyer sounds in negligence or intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, the legal profession’s concerns over the impact 
on zealous advocacy remain substantial. 
IV. LAWYER IIED CASES AND HOW THEY ILLUSTRATE THE ABOVE 
POINTS 
Despite the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ observation that the 
question of whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is a jury 
question—where reasonable minds could differ—numerous courts 
take the position that it is a question of law for the court.
126
  Even 
those courts that treat the question as generally being one for the jury 
often engage in especially rigorous scrutiny of a defendant’s conduct 
in IIED cases.
127
  And in cases involving claims of extreme and outra-
geous conduct on the part of lawyers, courts often engage in excep-
tionally rigorous scrutiny. 
A review of the decisional law involving IIED claims against at-
torneys reflects the tensions present in these cases as well as the over-
all doctrinal confusion surrounding the IIED tort.  One can discern a 
strong judicial reluctance to permit liability, particularly in the case of 
lawyer’s liability to a non-client.  Courts frequently conclude, as a 
matter of law, that a lawyer’s misconduct was not extreme and outra-
geous.  Yet, there are enough instances in which plaintiffs have ma-
naged to raise a triable issue regarding whether a lawyer’s conduct 
was extreme and outrageous that it is difficult to speak in terms of 
bright-line rules.  Indeed, one of the more troubling aspects of the 
decisional law in this area is the failure of courts to articulate, in any 
meaningful way, why a lawyer’s conduct is or is not extreme and out-
rageous. 
 
 126 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Denton Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1996) (ap-
plying Texas law); Gray v. State, 624 A.2d 479, 484 (Me. 1993) (“The determination 
of extreme and outrageous conduct from undisputed facts is an issue for the 
court.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1977). 
 127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
45 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
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A. Liability to Clients 
1. Incompetence and Lack of Diligence 
Clients have had little success with IIED claims premised on an 
attorney’s failure to live up to the duty of competence.  The IIED tort 
requires not only that a plaintiff demonstrate extreme and outra-
geous conduct, but also that the defendant acted with intent or in a 
reckless manner.
128
  Although disgruntled clients have sometimes 
tacked IIED claims on to their malpractice claims or attempted to ca-
tegorize their attorneys’ negligence as extreme and outrageous beha-
vior, courts have typically dispensed with such claims on the grounds 
that the required mental state was lacking or that the defendant’s ac-
tions were not extreme and outrageous.
129
  Thus, lawyers have es-
caped IIED liability for negligently conducting title searches,
130
 failing 
to conduct adequate investigations,
131
 failing to secure or interview 
witnesses,
132
 and failing to notify clients of their rights under applica-
ble statutes.
133
  Plaintiffs’ attempts to characterize a lawyer’s shortcom-
ings in more grandiose terms—such as the failure to zealously advo-
cate on the client’s behalf—have similarly failed where the failure 
amounts to little more than garden-variety malpractice.
134
 
 
 128 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 129 See, e.g., Williams v. Callaghan, 938 F. Supp. 46, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1996) (conclud-
ing that lawyer’s failure to, inter alia, conduct adequate investigation, was not ex-
treme and outrageous conduct); Galu v. Attias, 923 F. Supp. 590, 597–98 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (holding that criminal defense attorney’s failure to make a motion did not 
amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Thornton v. Squyres, 877 S.W.2d 921, 
923 (Ark. 1994) (holding that attorney’s failure to file an answer on behalf of client 
could not form the basis of IIED claim, despite harm to client); Amstead v. McFar-
land, 650 S.E.2d 737, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that attorney’s alleged mal-
practice in the form of failing to notify client of lawyer’s potential conflict of interest 
and client’s rights under statute did not amount to extreme and outrageous con-
duct); Young v. Hecht, 597 P.2d 682, 687 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming summary 
judgment in favor of lawyer due to lack of evidence of intent to inflict emotional dis-
tress).  
 130 See, e.g., Caddell v. Gates, 327 S.E.2d 351, 352 (S.C. 1984); see also Menuskin v. 
Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment in favor of 
lawyer who negligently misrepresented that client’s property was unencumbered by a 
lien). 
 131 See, e.g., Williams v. Callaghan, 938 F. Supp. 46, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 132 See, e.g., id.; Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989)  
 133 See, e.g., Amstead, 650 S.E.2d at 742. 
 134 See, e.g., Williams, 938 F. Supp. at 51–52; see also Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96 
P.3d 623, 629 (Idaho 2004) (concluding that lawyer’s failure to provide for bequest 
for husband in wife’s will could not support husband’s claim of negligence or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress). 
LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2012  6:07 PM 
2012] LAWYERS INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 79 
Clients have had perhaps slightly greater success where the at-
torney’s departure from the established duty of care involves a lack of 
diligence—more than a lack of skill or knowledge.  Although closely 
related to the duty of competence, a lawyer’s duty to diligently 
represent a client’s interests is listed separately from competence in 
the Model Rules.
135
  A comment explains that diligence involves pursuit 
of a client’s matter “despite opposition, obstruction or personal in-
convenience to the lawyer” and using “whatever lawful and ethical 
measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”
136
  A 
comment to the rule expressly notes the potential that neglect of a 
client matter may result in emotional distress to the client.
137
 
More often than not, attorneys have prevailed in IIED cases in-
volving charges of willful neglect, even where neglect of client mat-
ters appears to be standard operating procedure for the lawyer in 
question.
138
  For example, Thornton v. Squyres involved a lawyer’s fail-
ure to file an answer in a child custody matter, resulting in the client 
losing custody of her daughter.
139
  The client pursued an IIED claim 
against the attorney, and at trial introduced evidence of “Squyres’s 
total lack of any docket control system in disregard of his clients’ in-
terests [and] his failure to answer phone calls for three weeks.”
140
  If 
true, this was not merely carelessness on the part of the attorney.  
This was a pattern of conscious neglect in the face of a high probabil-
ity of injury to clients.  In addition, “when confronted with the result 
of his omission, Thornton aver[ed] Squyres implied that he delibe-
rately did not file an answer because he was not paid in full.”
141
  De-
spite this, the trial judge stated that “this is just a matter of negligence 
on the part of an attorney” and issued a directed verdict for the at-
torney.
142
  If the defendant’s actions could be considered extreme and 
outrageous, the trial court reasoned, then any simple malpractice 
 
 135 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011). 
 136 Id. cmt. 1. 
 137 See id. R. 1.3 cmt. 3 (“[U]nreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety 
and undermine confidence in the lawyer’s trustworthiness.”). 
 138 See O’Neil v. Vasseur, 796 P.2d 134, 141 (Idaho 1990) (concluding that lawyers’ 
failure to act in a case for nearly four years was not extreme and outrageous); see also 
Williams, 938 F. Supp. at 51–52  (granting summary judgment for attorney where at-
torney failed to adequately investigate claims or interview witnesses); Timms v. Ro-
senblum, 713 F. Supp 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff failed to 
state a claim based on lawyer’s failure to interview or secure necessary witnesses). 
 139 877 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ark. 1994). 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 923. 
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case could become an IIED case.
143
  On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court agreed with the trial judge’s reasoning and affirmed the 
judge’s conclusion that the attorney’s actions could not rise to the 
level of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support a ver-
dict for the client.
144
 
In contrast, Bowman v. Doherty involved a criminal defendant who 
alleged that he repeatedly asked his attorney to obtain a continuance 
due to the fact that he was out of town.
145
  The attorney assured the 
client that it would be no problem to obtain the continuance, but 
failed to do so.
146
  After the client was arrested for failing to appear for 
his scheduled hearing, he sued his lawyer for malpractice.
147
  Citing 
the majority rule that there can be no recovery for emotional distress 
in a malpractice action, the defendant moved for partial summary 
judgment on the plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress.
148
  On ap-
peal, however, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that this general rule 
does not apply “in cases of a wrong where the act is wanton or willful 
or where the act is committed with malice and intended to cause 
mental distress.”
149
  A defendant acts “wantonly,” the court explained, 
when the defendant acts with “‘reckless disregard or a complete indif-
ference or an unconcern for the probable consequences of the 
wrongful act.’”
150
  The court ultimately concluded that because the 
lawyer “should have known full well” that his client would end up in 
jail if he failed to live up to his duty of competence, a jury could rea-
sonably conclude that the lawyer acted wantonly or recklessly.
151
  Simi-
larly, in Lancaster v. Stevens, a Mississippi case, a convicted murderer’s 
IIED claim against his attorneys survived summary judgment where 
his habeas appeal had been dismissed due to his attorneys’ failure to 
prosecute the appeal.
152
 
 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 686 P.2d 112, 116 (Kan. 1984). 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. at 115–16. 
 148 Id. at 117. 
 149 Id. at 118. 
 150 Id. (quoting Vaughn v. Murray, 521 P.2d 262, 267 (Kan. 1974)). 
 151 Bowman, 686 P.2d at 119.  Although the Bowman court treated the client’s 
claim as fitting within a narrow category of exceptions to the general rule that emo-
tional distress damages are not recoverable in a malpractice action, the client’s legal 
theory was virtually indistinguishable from an IIED claim.  See id. 
 152 961 So. 2d 768 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).  Interestingly, the court permitted the 
claim to proceed despite its conclusion that the habeas appeal would have failed 
even if the attorneys had pursued the matter.  Id. 
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Thornton, Bowman, and Lancaster all involved lawyers who, at a 
minimum, acted in reckless disregard of the probability of emotional 
distress,
153
 a mental state sufficient to support a finding of IIED under 
the Restatement approach.
154
  The potential consequences of the law-
yers’ neglect were dramatic in each case, and there was almost cer-
tainly a violation of the duty of diligence on the part of each of the 
lawyers.  Thus, a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct in each 
case hardly seems a stretch.  Yet, the split in outcomes illustrates how 
difficult it may be to predict whether a court will permit an IIED 
claim against an attorney to proceed. 
2. Demands for Sexual Favors 
One recurring scenario that has triggered numerous disciplinary 
complaints and IIED claims has involved attorneys who have de-
manded sexual favors from clients.
155
  In some cases, the attorney’s 
conduct has amounted to harassment.  In others, the demands have 
been accompanied by explicit or implicit threats to withhold legal 
services or offers to accept sexual favors in lieu of payment.
156
  Al-
though clients have not always succeeded on their IIED claims due to 
some of the other restrictions of the tort, courts have generally been 
willing to conclude that sexual demands from clients amount to ex-
treme and outrageous conduct where the harassment is pervasive or 
is accompanied by these types of threats or offers.
157
 
 
 153 As Bowman illustrates, some courts have been willing to recognize a specific ex-
ception to the rule that emotional distress damages are unavailable in a legal mal-
practice action when the malpractice results in the loss of liberty.  E.g.,Wagenmann v. 
Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987); 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 9, § 21:11, at 
38. 
 154 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  Some jurisdictions require that a de-
fendant acted with the specific intent of causing distress.  See, e.g.,  Ely v. Whitlock, 
385 S.E.2d 893, 897 (Va. 1989). 
 155 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 373 (Ct. App. 1991); Brett v. 
Berkowitz, 706 A.2d 509, 513 (Del. 1998); Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1987); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Feneli, 712 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1999); Buckman-
Peirson v. Brannon, 822 N.E.2d 830, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Vallinoto v. DiSan-
dro, 688 A.2d 830, 838 (R.I. 1997); In re Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856, 856 (S.D. 1990).  
See generally Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (involving 
legal malpractice claim based on similar conduct); Malinda L. Seymore, Attorney-
Client Sex: A Feminist Critique of the Absence of Regulation, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 
176 (2003) (describing a variety of disciplinary cases involving lawyers who have had 
sex with clients). 
 156 See, e.g., McDaniel, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 370; Buckman-Peirson, 822 N.E.2d at 836; 
Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 833. 
 157 See, e.g., Buckman-Peirson, 822 N.E.2d at 836 (concluding that plaintiff’s claim 
failed due to lack of evidence regarding emotional distress and causation); Vallinoto, 
688 A.2d at 838 (concluding that plaintiff’s claim failed due to inability to produce 
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Clients have had noticeably less success when the claim does not 
involve an allegation of sexual coercion or a pattern of harassment 
and is instead based primarily on the mere fact that a sexual relation-
ship between lawyer and client existed.
158
  Courts have historically 
been disinclined to recognize IIED claims involving spurned lovers 
and matters of the heart.
159
  However, sex between lawyers and their 
clients arguably implicates special concerns.  ABA Model Rule 1.8(j) 
generally prohibits a lawyer from engaging in sexual relations with a 
client.
160
 The comment accompanying the rule explains that the rule 
is based, in part, on the fact that there is almost always a disparity of 
power in the lawyer-client relationship.
161
  Further, because a lawyer 
“occupies the highest position of trust and confidence,” there is the 
potential for a lawyer to exploit the trust of the client.
162
  In imposing 
discipline against lawyers for engaging in sexual relationships with 
clients, courts have noted that clients may be particularly vulnerable 
due to their need for legal representation, thus increasing the risks of 
emotional harm stemming from a lawyer’s exploitation of client 
trust.
163
  Despite these special concerns, courts have been reluctant to 
 
admissible evidence of “physical symptomatology resulting from the alleged impro-
per conduct”).   
 158 See, e.g., Guiles v. Simser, 804 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (dismissing 
IIED claim where lawyer and client engaged in a consensual sexual relationship 
“characterized by an exchange of many expressions of loving endearments”); Sand-
ers v. Rosen, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805, 811–12 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (concluding that attorney who 
terminated relationship with client had not engaged in extreme and outrageous 
conduct); Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 238  (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding 
that lawyer’s act of billing client after he broke off sexual relationship with her did 
not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct).  
 159 See, e.g., Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 338–39 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (dis-
missing former husband’s IIED action against wife’s paramour on the grounds that it 
was barred by heart balm statute or, alternatively, was not outrageous); id. at 339 
(noting that majority of courts have concluded that adulterous conduct is not ex-
treme and outrageous for purposes of IIED claim); M.N. v. D.S., 616 N.W.2d 284, 288 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that plaintiff’s IIED claim based on defendant’s 
fraudulent promise to leave his wife was barred by state statute abolishing “heart-
balm” actions); Sanders, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 811–12 (noting that New York does not per-
mit IIED claims stemming from marital disputes or the termination of a romantic or 
sexual relationship). 
 160 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2007). 
 161 Id. cmt. 17. 
 162 Id.  
 163 See, e.g., People v. Beecher, 224 P.3d 442, 450 (Colo. 2009) (“[M]ost parties to 
a divorce action are extremely emotionally vulnerable.”); In re Disciplinary Proceed-
ing Against Halverson, 998 P.2d 833, 838 n.4 (Wash. 2000) (stating that by engaging 
in sexual relationships with clients, lawyer was exposing clients “to greater risks of 
emotional harm”), abrogated on other grounds by In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Anschell, 69 P.3d 844, 853 n.5 (Wash. 2003); see also Okla. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics 
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allow IIED claims stemming from consensual relationships between 
lawyers and clients to reach juries. 
In contrast, when a lawyer’s sexual advances are unwelcome and 
are either repeated or involve implied threats to withhold services, 
courts are more willing to classify the conduct as outrageous.  Lawyers 
have faced significant disciplinary sanctions for engaging in such 
conduct.
164
  However, in addressing IIED claims against attorneys who 
requested sexual favors in return for legal services, courts have 
tended not to rely upon the violation of applicable rules of profes-
sional conduct in deciding whether a lawyer’s actions were outra-
geous for purposes of an IIED claim.  Courts have, however, pointed 
to the concerns underlying the prohibition on sexual relations with 
clients in concluding that a lawyer’s actions were outrageous.  Specif-
ically, courts have pointed to the special relationship of trust between 
lawyer and client, the lawyers’ knowledge of the fact that a client is 
often in an emotional or vulnerable state resulting from the need for 
legal representation, and the potential for exploitation of these reali-
ties.
165
  Ultimately then, it is not the existence of a sexual relationship 
per se that is extreme and outrageous, “but rather the attorney’s at-
tempt to exploit the professional relationship to gain unsolicited sex-
ual favors.”
166
 
 
Comm., Ethics Op. No. 308 (noting that “clients involved in domestic, child custody, 
criminal, and pro bono cases” are particularly vulnerable to the use of confidential 
client in an attempt to manipulate the client into a sexual relationship).  See generally 
In re Berg, 955 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Kan. 1998) (involving lawyer who had sex with sui-
cidal divorce client). 
 164 See, e.g., In re Piatt, 951 P.2d 889, 891–92 (Ariz. 1997) (censuring attorney for 
harassing female clients and threatening to withdraw from representation if clients 
did not consent); Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 
N.W.2d 682, 703–04 (Iowa 2006) (indefinitely suspending lawyer for engaging in 
“sex-for-fees arrangement”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423, 
451 (Md. 2004) (disbarring attorney for, inter alia, threatening to withdraw from re-
presentation unless the client consented to sexual contact); In re Witherspoon, 3 
A.3d 496, 506–07 (N.J. 2010) (suspending lawyer for one year for attempting to bar-
ter legal services for sex); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Feneli, 712 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ohio 
1999) (suspending lawyer for eighteen months for attempting to barter legal services 
for sex); In re Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856, 857 (S.D. 1990) (suspending lawyer for one 
year for engaging in sexual relationships with clients).  But see In re Witherspoon, 3 
A.3d at 512 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (“Any new attorney, fresh from the law school 
study of ethics and professional responsibility, will wonder how any penalty short of 
disbarment would be appropriate discipline for respondent’s behavior.”). 
 165 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 373 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Wi-
therspoon, 3 A.3d at 506 (“Most clients are under stress and feel vulnerable when con-
sulting with counsel.”). 
 166 Sanders v. Rosen, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1993). 
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For example, Buckman-Peirson v. Brannon involved a client’s alle-
gation of repeated sexual harassment by her attorney.
167
  On the law-
yer’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court observed that, on 
its face, the lawyer’s conduct was not beyond all bounds of decency; 
however, the fact that the defendant was a lawyer “complicated” mat-
ters. 
168
  The court explained that due to the fact that litigation was 
ongoing, the client “may have felt compelled to put up with many of 
defendant’s shenanigans in order to successfully conclude her litiga-
tion.”
169
  Thus, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude 
that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.
170
 
3. Permitting or Concealing Conflicts of Interest and 
Other Breaches of Loyalty 
Another possible scenario involves the attorney who permits or 
conceals a conflict of interest or who otherwise breaches the duty of 
loyalty owed to a client.
171
  Loyalty to clients is one of the fundamental 
values of the legal profession.
172
 Thus, there is a potentially strong ar-
gument that an intentional betrayal of that duty could, in appropriate 
circumstances, rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. 
a. Conflicts of Interest 
One component of a lawyer’s duty of loyalty is the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest.
173
  While conflicts may arise from any number of 
sources, perhaps most common are the situations in which a lawyer 
represents multiple clients with adverse interests or represents a 
client in the same or substantially related matter in which the lawyer 
formerly represented a client.
174
  In the former instance, one of the 
primary concerns is the sense of betrayal and the loss of trust a cur-
rent client may feel upon learning that his or her lawyer—the client’s 
 
 167 822 N.E.2d 830, 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
 168 Id. at 835. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 836. 
 171 See, e.g., Meyers v. Sudfeld, No. Civ.A.05-2970, 2006 WL 401855, at *6–7 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 1, 2006); Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 368 (Cal. 1990); McMahon v. 
West, No. B154225, 2003 WL 22245881, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2003); Sellens v. 
Am. States Ins. Co., No. 90976, 2004 WL 2160770, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 
2004); Kingsley v. Neumeier, No. 06-P-732, 2007 WL 2458480, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
Aug. 30, 2007); Goodman v. Kotzen, 647 A.2d 247, 248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).   
 172 See Saunders v. State, 10 So. 3d 53, 94 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (stating that the 
duty of loyalty to a client is “fundamental”). 
 173 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4 (1986). 
 174 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2011); id. R. 1.9(a). 
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“advocate and . . . champion”—is representing another party with in-
terests that are in conflict with those of the client.
175
  In the case of 
former client conflicts, the primary concern is the danger that, in or-
der to adequately represent the current client, the lawyer will use re-
levant, confidential information provided by the former client to the 
former client’s disadvantage.
176
  Disciplinary authorities sometimes 
view the fact that a lawyer benefits from a conflict of interest as an ag-
gravating factor in deciding what type of professional discipline is ap-
propriate.
177
 
Regardless of the type of conflict at issue, breach of fiduciary du-
ty and legal malpractice claims are fairly common.
178
  Where the law-
yer in question intentionally conceals a conflict from a client, a fraud 
claim might be more appropriate.
179
  However, at least one court has 
imported a rule from the law regarding legal malpractice and held 
that in order to prevail on such a fraud claim, a client must establish 
that the conflict actually caused the client to lose on the underlying 
claim.
180
  Thus, causation may be a problem for some clients alleging 
fraud.
181
 
Accordingly, an IIED claim might theoretically be an alternative.  
In the few decided cases involving this issue, however, plaintiffs have 
had little success convincing courts that intentional concealment of a 
conflict of interest or continued representation in the face of an ob-
 
 175 Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964). 
 176 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2011) (“Matters are ‘substan-
tially related’ for purposes of this Rule if . . . there otherwise is a substantial risk that 
confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior 
representation would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent mat-
ter.”). 
 177 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.31 (1986) (stating that 
disbarment is generally appropriate when lawyer has a conflict of interest and, inter 
alia, seeks to benefit). 
 178 See, e.g., Kan. City Mall Assocs., Inc. v. McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., 
No. 102,151, 2010 WL 920847, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2010) (involving negli-
gence and breach of fiduciary duty claims stemming from alleged conflict of inter-
est); Trs. of Ohio Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 938 N.E.2d 61, 
62–63 (Ohio 2010) (same).  Although there is potential overlap between these theo-
ries, “[p]rofessional negligence implicates a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary 
duty implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty.”  Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d 
777, 797 (Conn. 2006). 
 179 See Kingsley v. Neumeier, No. 06-P-732, 2007 WL 2458480, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
Aug. 30, 2007) (involving misrepresentation claim against attorney based on con-
cealment of conflict of interest). 
 180 Id. at *1–2. 
 181 But see Meyers v. Sudfeld, No. Civ.A.05-2970, 2006 WL 401855, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 1, 2006) (concluding plaintiff who alleged fraudulent concealment of a conflict 
on the part of attorney had stated a claim for fraud).  
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vious conflict amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct.
182
  For 
example, in the New York case of Sherbak v. Doughty, an attorney alle-
gedly represented both sides in a real estate transaction and then 
took actions contrary to the plaintiff’s interests, including instituting 
a lawsuit against him.
183
  The court—in one sentence and without ex-
planation—concluded that although the plaintiff may have stated a 
claim for malpractice, the attorney’s actions did not, as a matter of 
law, rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
184
 
An exception to the trend away from finding liability or explain-
ing conclusions regarding the outrageousness of the defendant’s ac-
tion is the Kentucky case of Goebel v. Arnett.
185
  In Goebel, the plaintiff 
contacted an adoption agency about putting her expected child up 
for adoption.
186
  The agency referred her to a lawyer, Arnett.
187
  How-
ever, the agency failed to inform the plaintiff that Arnett was also the 
sole shareholder of the agency.
188
  Arnett informed the plaintiff that a 
couple wished to adopt the child and would pay for the plaintiff’s le-
gal and medical expenses.
189
  However, Arnett failed to inform the 
plaintiff that the agency would also be receiving a separate fee.
190
  Fi-
nally, when the child’s father challenged custody, Arnett persuaded 
the plaintiff to perjure herself.
191
  In concluding that the plaintiff’s 
IIED claim should survive summary judgment, the court opined that 
Arnett’s conduct “fell outside the bounds of common decency and 
most assuredly constituted allegations of serious violations of the 
Code of Professional Conduct governing all attorneys.”
192
  Based on 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship, the plaintiff “was en-
titled at all times to rely on Arnett’s duty of loyalty and to expect can-
 
 182 See id. at *6 (dismissing claim because “a cause of action for outrageous con-
duct does not exist under Pennsylvania law”); Amstead v. McFarland, 650 S.E.2d 737, 
741–42 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that lawyer’s failure to advise client about 
potential conflicts posed by his representation of both client and her ex-husband was 
not extreme and outrageous); Kingsley, 2007 WL 2458480, at *2 (“[Plaintiff] failed to 
claim or provide evidence that defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.”). 
 183 420 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (App. Div. 1979). 
 184 Id. 
 185 259 S.W.3d 489 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). 
 186 Id. at 490. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Goebel, S.W.3d at 491. 
 192 Id. at 493. 
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did advice tailored to promote her best interests.”
193
  Instead, Arnett 
deceived and took advantage of the plaintiff’s known vulnerable con-
dition.
194
  Thus, the plaintiff’s claim survived summary judgment.
195
 
b. Other Breaches of Loyalty 
Decisional law involving IIED claims premised upon other 
breaches of loyalty to clients is decidedly more mixed.  As is the case 
more generally, lawyers have tended to prevail on the question of ex-
treme and outrageous conduct where their actions allegedly 
represent a betrayal of trust.
196
  In some instances, the betrayals have 
been quite serious.
197
  For instance, in Green v. Leibowitz, the lawyer af-
firmatively lied to the client about the status and filing of the client’s 
claim for disability benefits.
198
  A New York appellate court concluded 
that, despite the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the client and despite the 
fact that the client had stated a claim for fraud, the lawyer’s actions, 
as a matter of law, were not extreme and outrageous.
199
  As is common 
when courts find that a lawyer’s conduct does not qualify as extreme 
and outrageous, the court reached its conclusion merely by referenc-
ing the Restatement’s “beyond all bounds of decency” standard and 
summarily stating that the lawyer’s conduct did not satisfy this stan-
dard.
200
 
Yet, in other instances, clients have enjoyed more success on 
their IIED claims based on similar breaches.  In Singleton v. Foreman, 
the lawyer entered into an unethical contingent fee agreement with 
his client in a divorce proceeding.
201
  When the client expressed a de-
sire to her attorney to settle her case, the attorney “exploded into a 
 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id.  
 195 Id. at 494. 
 196 See, e.g., Jones v. Law Firm of Hill & Ponton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1290–91 
(M.D. Fla. 2002) (concluding that lawyer’s improper withdrawal from representation 
and failure to provide imprisoned client with notice of withdrawal, deliver necessary 
papers, or allow client time to employ another lawyer was not extreme and outra-
geous); Miller v. Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, 978 P.2d 922, 932 
(Kan. 1999) (failing to keep client “apprised of the progress of his case and in failing 
to notify him of the settlement hearing was a serious breach of fiduciary duty” but 
did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Sawabani v. Desenberg, 
372 N.W.2d 559, 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (publishing allegedly defamatory state-
ments about client to client’s insurer was not extreme and outrageous).  
 197 See, e.g., Green v. Leibowitz, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (App. Div. 1979). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 148–49. 
 200 Id. at 148; see supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 201 435 F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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torrent of abuse, refused to allow her to settle, and threatened to ruin 
both Mrs. Singleton and her husband.”
202
  Pointing to the lawyer’s 
ethical responsibility to not allow his personal feelings to impact his 
representation of the client, the court concluded that the client had 
stated an IIED claim.
203
  In a Mississippi case, a client won a substan-
tial jury award based on the fact that his lawyer had engaged in an 
adulterous affair with his wife.
204
 
4. Disclosure of Confidential Information 
Another situation in which clients have had at least some success 
in pursuing IIED claims against their attorneys has been when the at-
torneys have wrongfully disclosed confidential client information.
205
  
In Herbin v. Hoeffel, the plaintiff brought an IIED claim against his at-
torney, alleging that the attorney had breached his duty of confiden-
tiality by disclosing information in order to assist the prosecution.
206
  
The D.C. Court of Appeals referred to a lawyer’s duty to maintain 
client confidences as one of “uberrima fides” and noted that the duty 
applied not just to information protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege but to unprivileged secrets as well.
207
  Citing a lawyer’s ethical du-
ties, the court stated that “‘[a]ctions which violate public policy may 
constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to state a cause of action for 
infliction of emotional distress.’”
208
  Ultimately, the court concluded 
that “[i]n light of the high value we place on a lawyer’s duty of loyalty 
and to preserve client confidences,” the attorney’s actions, if proven, 
could amount to extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of an 
IIED claim.
209
 
B. Liability to Non-Clients 
Clients have had mixed success with their IIED claims against 
lawyers.  Non-clients face an even more formidable challenge.  A law-
yer and a non-client typically do not have a relationship of trust.  Si-
milarly, one of the well-established rules of tort law as applied to law-
 
 202 Id. at 970 (internal quotations omitted). 
 203 Id. at 970–71.  
 204 Pierce v. Cook, 992 So. 2d 612, 615 (Miss. 2008). 
 205 See, e.g., Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265–67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) 
(reversing summary judgment in favor of lawyers on client’s IIED and breach of fidu-
ciary duty claims based on lawyers’ disclosure of client information to prosecutors). 
 206 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. 2002). 
 207 Id. at 197. 
 208 Id. (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984)). 
 209 Id. 
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yers is that lawyers owe no duty of care to non-clients.
210
  Given these 
realities, it may be especially difficult for a non-client to establish that 
a lawyer’s conduct was extreme and outrageous for purposes of an 
IIED claim.
211
  The burden is only heightened when the lawyer and 
non-client are on opposites sides of a matter and therefore have an 
adversarial relationship.  But as is the case more generally with IIED, 
it is sometimes difficult to predict the outcomes in these cases. 
1. Litigation-Related Misconduct and Incivility 
a. Litigation-Related Misconduct 
An opposing party’s tort claims against a lawyer based on the 
lawyer’s alleged misconduct during the litigation process raise con-
cerns about the chilling effect on zealous advocacy on behalf of a 
client.
212
  Perhaps for this reason, opposing parties have had little suc-
cess against lawyers on their IIED claims based on litigation-related 
behavior.  For example, it is nearly black-letter law at this point that 
the filing of a legal action is not, by itself, extreme and outrageous 
conduct.
213
  Even if the filing of a legal action could qualify, the abso-
lute litigation privilege might nonetheless shield an attorney from 
liability.
214
 
 
 210 Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96 P.3d 623, 628 (Idaho 2004).  
 211 See Argoe v. Three Rivers Behavioral Ctr. & Psychiatric Solutions, 697 S.E.2d 
551, 555 (S.C. 2010) (affirming summary judgment in attorney’s favor on plaintiff’s 
IIED claim due to lack of attorney-client relationship). 
 212 Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, 682–83 (Haw. 2008). 
 213 See, e.g., Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 382 (10th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismis-
sal on IIED claim stemming from, inter alia, the filing of a baseless lawsuit resulting 
from attorney’s inadequate investigation); Savell, Williams, Cox & Angel v. Codding-
ton, 335 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (“The behavior attributed to the [de-
fendants] in this case cannot reasonably be characterized as humiliating, insulting, 
or terrifying, being confined, as it was, to the preparation and filing of legal plead-
ings.”) (citations omitted); see also Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
151, 169 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that defendant’s filing of interpleader action 
did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Rolleston v. Huie, 400 S.E.2d 
349, 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he mere filing of a lawsuit is not the type of humi-
liating, insulting or terrifying conduct which will give rise to a claim for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.”); Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 441 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 
(Mass. 1982) (concluding that attorney did not engage in extreme and outrageous 
conduct by commencing collection action against plaintiffs on behalf of client); 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 32 (Utah 2003) (“An 
allegation of improper filing of a lawsuit or the use of legal process against an indi-
vidual is not redressable by a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.”). 
 214 See Bennett, 70 P.3d at 32.  
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Despite plaintiffs’ general lack of success in this area, it is cer-
tainly conceivable that filing a complaint or motion or threatening to 
do so could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.  
When, for example, a demand letter is accompanied by extortionate 
threats, an IIED claim might be a possibility.
215
  IIED plaintiffs, how-
ever, have had little success establishing that a threat made during 
the course of representation satisfied the “extreme and outrageous” 
threshold.
216
 
Engaging in vexatious or harassing litigation tactics might also 
possibly rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.  Lawyers 
are, of course, ethically prohibited from asserting frivolous claims.
217
  
They are also prohibited from engaging in actions that “have no sub-
stantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third 
person.”
218
  Lawyers are also ethically prohibited from engaging in 
dishonest behavior during the litigation process, including destroying 
evidence and knowingly introducing perjured testimony.
219
 
But, as a whole, IIED plaintiffs have had little success on claims 
involving possibly overly zealous representation.  Although there is 
sometimes the same tendency in these cases for a court to simply re-
cite the Restatement’s “beyond all bounds of decency” language and 
include boilerplate citation to precedent, courts are more likely in 
this context to explain their conclusions with reference to the con-
cern over chilling legitimate advocacy.
220
  For example, in East River 
 
 215 See Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 5 (Cal. 2006) (involving allegations of civil ex-
tortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful interference with 
economic advantage stemming from demand letter).  
 216 See,e.g., Ulmer v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (conclud-
ing that lawyer’s threat to force opposing party into bankruptcy if he did not accept 
settlement offer was not extreme and outrageous); see also Keller v. Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (D. Utah 1995) (concluding that attorney’s threat 
to put plaintiff out of business, “take everything he owned,” and “follow Plaintiff to 
his grave” unless plaintiff dropped matter against defendant was not extreme and 
outrageous).  Instigating criminal proceedings against a party during a civil proceed-
ing stands on somewhat different footing and is discussed in greater detail infra Part 
IV.B.3.a. 
 217 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010). 
 218 Id. R. 4.4(a). 
 219 Id. R. 4.1; id. R. 8.4(c); id. R. 3.4(a).  See generally Kachig v. Boothe, 99 Cal. 
Rptr. 393, 402–03 (Ct. App. 1971) (involving IIED claim based upon introduction of 
false evidence); Mongardi v. Kiely, No. 015367, 2002 WL 31379946, at *2 (Mass. Dist. 
Ct. Sept. 18, 2002) (involving IIED claim based upon perjured testimony); Sharon-
ville v. Am. Emp’r Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833, 835 (Ohio 2006) (involving claims of 
spoliation of evidence and IIED based upon alleged cover-up of evidence by police 
officers).  
 220 See, e.g., Devlin v. Fishman, 224 Cal. Rptr. 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding 
that filing a lawsuit known to be vulnerable to a statute of limitations defense was not 
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Savings Bank v. Steele, a Georgia court held as a matter of law that a 
lawyer who accused the plaintiff of perjury during cross-examination 
and threatened to bring perjury charges against the plaintiff did not 
engage in extreme and outrageous conduct, despite the fact that the 
statements allegedly led the plaintiff to suffer a heart attack.
221
  While 
referring to the lawyer’s “severe cross-examination” as “discourteous 
and unprofessional,” the court was concerned about the impact that 
subjecting the lawyer to tort liability would have on lawyers’ willing-
ness to engage in rigorous cross-examination: 
Litigation and, more particularly, cross-examination are by design 
rough-and-tumble, fraught with stress and tension. . . . Cross-
examination is the cornerstone of our trial system.  Through 
probing and challenging questioning by a zealous advocate, the 
jury and the judge are aided in evaluating the witness, and ulti-
mately perceiving the truth.  While it is the duty of the trial court 
to protect a witness from abuse, the widest possible latitude must 
be given to the advocate in order to ensure a thorough and sifting 
cross-examination.
222
 
Courts have likewise been reluctant to classify delaying or misleading 
behavior during the discovery process as extreme and outrageous.
223
 
Ordinarily, the fact that individuals are on opposite sides of liti-
gation negates any possibility of a relationship of trust for purposes of 
tort law.  For example, a litigant generally has no cause of action for 
negligent misrepresentation against the attorney for the other side 
 
extreme and outrageous); Heim v. Cal. Fed. Bank, 828 A.2d 129, 141 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2003) (concluding that attorney who allegedly engaged in a variety of miscon-
duct, including withholding documents and refusing to withdraw a motion for a de-
ficiency judgment after it had been dismissed by the court, did not engage in ex-
treme and outrageous conduct); Wong v. Panis, 772 P.2d 695, 700 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1986) (concluding attorney’s acts of filing counterclaims and submitting allegedly 
abusive interrogatories on behalf of clients was not extreme and outrageous); Preis v. 
Durio, 649 So. 2d 600, 603 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (granting lawyer’s motion to dismiss 
IIED claim based on lawyer’s discussion with children of father’s adulterous behavior 
during divorce proceeding); see also Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 
465, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that 
“[a]dvocating on behalf of one’s client” does not constitute extreme and outrageous 
conduct).  But see Green v. Fischbein, Olivieri, Rozenholc & Badillo, 522 N.Y.S.2d 
529, 531 (App. Div. 1987) (denying summary judgment to lawyer who, on behalf of 
client, “engaged in a concerted course of conduct designed to harass, intimidate and 
interfere with plaintiff’s tenancy,” including filing numerous meritless eviction pro-
ceedings).  
 221 311 S.E.2d 189, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
 222 Id. at 191.  See generally Nestlerode v. Fed. Ins. Co., 414 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. 
Div. 1979) (holding that lawyer who made intimidating remarks to opposing party 
during recess at trial did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct). 
 223 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Jensen, No. 29770, 2004 WL 2034988, at *6 (Idaho Ct. 
App. Sept. 14, 2004).   
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due to the absence of any duty of care on the part of the attorney.
224
  
But, an exception exists when the lawyer invites reliance and assumes 
a duty toward the other litigant.
225
  Similarly, a plaintiff pursuing an 
IIED claim against an opposing attorney for litigation-related mis-
conduct may have difficulty establishing that the opposing attorney’s 
conduct was extreme and outrageous due to the fact that the attorney 
did not violate a relationship of trust—one of the hallmarks of ex-
treme and outrageous conduct.
226
  A finding of extreme and outra-
geous conduct under such circumstances is not, however, completely 
out of the circumstances. 
In Silberg v. Anderson, for example, a husband brought a variety 
of claims, including IIED, against his former wife’s divorce attorney, 
Anderson.
227
  As part of the dissolution proceedings, the parties 
agreed to psychological evaluation and counseling.
228
  With the hus-
band’s approval, Anderson recommended a psychologist named Ad-
ler.
229
  However, Anderson allegedly failed to inform the husband that 
she had a romantic relationship with Adler.
230
  When Adler’s evalua-
tion of the husband turned out to be less positive than the husband 
would have liked, thus allegedly resulting in less advantageous visita-
tion rights, the husband sued Anderson for IIED.
231
  The trial court 
sustained Anderson’s demurrer, but on appeal, the appellate court 
gave the husband leave to amend his IIED claim to include an allega-
tion of deception.
232
 
Silberg illustrates that the fact that the plaintiff and defendant are 
on opposites sides of litigation does not necessarily prevent the plain-
tiff from proceeding on an IIED claim.  In Silberg, the appellate court 
conceded that there was no relationship of trust between the plaintiff 
and the defendant.
233
  But, the court also observed that, as alleged, 
Anderson had abused her position “as an officer of the court” to the 
detriment of Silberg, thus implying that Anderson’s actions were 
 
 224 Long, supra note 93, at 434. 
 225 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2) (2000). 
 226 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 227 786 P.2d 365, 367–68 (Cal. 1990). 
 228 Id. at 367. 
 229 Id.  
 230 Id. at 367–68. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Silberg v. Anderson, 249 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701–02 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled by 
786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1990). 
 233 Id. at 702 (noting lawyers owe no duty of care to opposing parties). 
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more egregious by virtue of her status as a lawyer.
234
  In addition, as 
the underlying matter involved the dissolution of marriage and child 
custody issues, Anderson, as a lawyer, had knowledge of Silberg’s par-
ticular susceptibility to emotional distress.
235
 
Nonetheless, Silberg also illustrates the difficulty IIED plaintiffs 
face when attempting to hold an opposing attorney liable for litiga-
tion misconduct.  On appeal, the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the litigator’s absolute privilege for statements made in 
the course of litigation applied and shielded Anderson from liabili-
ty.
236
  According to the court, the privilege is “the backbone to an ef-
fective and smoothly operating judicial system” and is essential to 
preserving the ability of lawyers to zealously advocate on behalf of 
their clients.
237
  Courts have applied this privilege with respect to oth-
er forms of litigation-related conduct, including the filing of a lawsuit 
and the making of defamatory statements in connection with litiga-
tion.
238
  In other instances, courts have concluded that a lawyer’s ac-
tions on behalf of a client in connection with the litigation process 
are privileged more generally, without specific reference to the litiga-
tor’s privilege.
239
  Thus, even where a lawyer’s conduct toward an op-
posing party is so egregious that it satisfies the “extreme and outra-
geous” threshold, the absolute litigator’s privilege may prevent 
recovery. 
b. Incivility 
One of the more common refrains in the legal profession (and 
society more generally) is that there has been a steady decline in civil-
 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id.; see supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing litigants’ particular 
susceptibility to emotional distress in such cases). 
 236 Silberg, 786 P.2d at 374. 
 237 Id. at 370. 
 238 E.g., Rose v. Wissinger, 439 A.2d 1193, 1199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Bennett v. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 32 (Utah 2003); see also Chaun-
cey v. Niems, 227 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that defendant’s 
act of filing lengthy interrogatories knowing they alleged false and fraudulent facts to 
mislead opposing part and the court was privileged); Sullivan v. Birmingham, 416 
N.E.2d 528, 534 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (concluding that lawyer’s inclusion of an ad 
damnum clause in complaint in violation of state statute was privileged); Rabinowitz v. 
Wahrenberger, 966 A.2d 1091, 1097–98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (concluding 
that privilege applied to lawyer’s rigorous questioning of father during a deposition 
in a case involving the death of father’s child); Abrams v. Pecile, 924 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 
(App. Div. 2011) (concluding that lawyer’s refusal to return allegedly stolen photo-
graph in an attempt to force plaintiff to settle underlying case was privileged). 
 239 See Rohda v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (D. Colo. 1988) 
(concluding lawyer was privileged to move for new trial on behalf of client). 
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ity in recent decades.
240
  Tales and disciplinary decisions involving 
unprofessional behavior on the part of lawyers during the litigation 
process abound.
241
  The legal profession has attempted to address this 
perceived rise in incivility in various ways, ranging from the promo-
tion of inns of court to the promulgation of civility and professional-
ism codes.
242
  Another possibility for a party aggrieved by a lawyer’s 
rude and uncivil behavior might be an IIED claim.
243
 
An attorney’s discourteous behavior might implicate a number 
of disciplinary rules.  For instance, lawyers have faced discipline for 
engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
244
  Discipline is 
also possible for the attorney who engages in behavior having no sub-
stantial purpose other than to harass another.
245
 
A party seeking to bring such a claim, however, may run face-first 
into the well-established rule of thumb that liability does not exist 
under an IIED theory for mere insults and uncivil behavior.
246
  One 
author has suggested that the courts’ restrictive view of the IIED tort 
developed because “the courts wanted to protect themselves from be-
ing overwhelmed with attempts to turn mere bad manners or petty 
incivilities into court cases.”
247
  Add to this the fact that many courts 
view litigation as a “rough and tumble” process in which tempers of-
ten run high, and non-parties face a formidable task in attempting to 
establish that a lawyer’s incivility amounts to extreme and outrageous 
 
 240 See Harris, supra note 109, at 568–70 (discussing decline of civility in the prac-
tice of law). 
 241 See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Coe, 665 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Wis. 
2003) (imposing discipline for incivility); Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers Sanctioned for 
E-Mail Insults, Including ‘Scum Sucking Loser’ Comment, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 3, 2011, 6:00 AM 
CST), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_sanctioned_for_e-
mail_insults_including_scum_sucking_loser_comment (detailing discipline of two 
lawyers “who called each other a ‘retard’ and ‘scum sucking loser’ in escalating e-
mail insults”). 
 242 Elliot L. Bien, Toward a Community of Professionalism, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
475, 478 (2001); Adam Owen Glist, Note, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the 
Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV 757, 757–58 (2000). 
 243 See Hannes v. Pechner, No. C042624, 2004 WL 937985, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 30, 2004) (involving IIED claim based on altercation in courthouse involving 
opposing attorneys). 
 244 See In re Turner, 631 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. 1994) (involving lawyer who told a judge 
that the judge ran a “Mickey Mouse court” and walked out of court); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d) (2011) (prohibiting such conduct). 
 245 See In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 395 (Minn. 1987) (publicly reprimanding 
lawyer for using means having no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, 
or burden a third person, including posing questions designed to degrade witness). 
 246 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 247 Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Cases: Dignitary Torts in 
a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20 (1989). 
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conduct.  Thus, name-calling might potentially lead to professional 
discipline,
248
 but it is unlikely to amount to extreme and outrageous 
conduct for purposes of an IIED claim.
249
 
For example, in Haller v. Phillips, a lawyer representing a com-
plainant in a criminal investigation allegedly telephoned the plaintiff 
at home and called him a “son of a bitch.”
250
  An Ohio appellate court 
observed that although the lawyer’s behavior was “rude and abusive,” 
it was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as 
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.”
251
 Similarly, in Nestlerode 
v Federal Insurance Co., a lawyer made several statements to the oppos-
ing party during a recess at trial that, in the court’s words, “were un-
fortunate and better left unsaid.”
252
  The “unfortunate” comments in-
cluded the lawyer questioning whether the plaintiff realized how 
much he had to lose in the lawsuit and that the lawyer was “going to 
go all the way.”
253
  While the lawyer’s statements were certainly rude, 
vaguely threatening, and probably in violation of the ethical rule 
prohibiting communication with a represented party, they were not 
so extreme as to be “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
254
 
2. Debt Collection 
Overly-aggressive debt collection attempts have generated any 
number of legal claims.
255
 Consumer protection statutes may provide 
a remedy for individuals who have been subject to such attempts.
256
  
Lawyers are not immune to such claims.  In 2010, for example, the 
Supreme Court held that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
 
 248 See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Turgeon, 557 S.E.2d 235, 239 (W. Va. 2000) (in-
volving lawyer who referred to other lawyer as a “coke dealer” in front of jury); see also 
Have a Nice Day, LEGAL PROF. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2010/09/have-a-nice-day.html 
(discussing disciplinary charges brought against an attorney who referred to another 
attorney as a “piece of shit”). 
 249 See Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (D. Utah 1995) 
(concluding that lawyer’s statement that he would crush opposing party “like a pea-
nut” did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Ulmer v. Frisard, 694 
So. 2d 1046, 1049 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that lawyer’s threat to “clean 
[plaintiff’s] clock” did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct). 
 250 591 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). 
 251 Id. at 307. 
 252 414 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. Div. 1979). 
 253 Id. at 399. 
 254 Id. at 400. 
 255 See, e.g., Vanderbilt Mortg. & Finance, Inc. v. Flores, 746 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (involving fraud and RICO claims). 
 256 See The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2006).  
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which is designed to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, does 
not provide debt collectors and their attorneys with a good faith de-
fense to liability for misinterpretations of the law.
257
 
IIED claims remain another possibility.  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts cites debt-collection attempts as a special situation in which 
IIED liability might arise.
258
  Even prior to the Restatement’s recogni-
tion of the IIED tort, several courts had allowed for recovery for pure-
ly emotional harms stemming from abusive collection tactics.
259
  On 
occasion, lawyers have faced IIED claims stemming from their at-
tempts to collect a debt on behalf of a client and from a client. 
a. IIED Claims Stemming from Attempts to Collect a Debt 
on Behalf of a Client 
Lawyers, like other defendants, may potentially face liability for 
attempting to collect a debt in a harassing or otherwise extreme 
manner.
260
  A comment to section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides that an individual does not face liability for asserting a 
legal right in a permissible way.
261
  This is true even where the defen-
dant knows that emotional distress may occur.
262
  But, where the at-
tempt to collect debt involves harassment or other impermissible 
means, liability remains a possibility.
263
 
 
 257 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1624 
(2010). 
 258 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965); see also Fraker, supra note 
7, at 990 (“One of the most prominent lines of cases in the evolution of IIED arose 
from . . . the pressure tactics of humiliating debtors into repayment . . . .”). 
 259 Fraker, supra note 7, at 991.  
 260 See, e.g., Perk v. Worden, 475 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Va. 2007) (concluding 
that plaintiff stated a claim where lawyer allegedly used abusive language and lied to 
plaintiff in order to obtain a default judgment); Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIn-
tyre, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1513, 1527 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that plaintiff had stated a 
cause of action based on law firm’s attempts to collect a debt on behalf of client, in-
cluding falsely telling plaintiff that there was a warrant out for her arrest); Champlin 
v. Wash. Trust Co., 478 A.2d 985, 990 (R.I. 1984) (concluding that lawyer did not en-
gage in extreme and outrageous conduct in the absence of any finding of abusive or 
threatening conduct). 
 261 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1977) (“The actor is never lia-
ble, for example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a 
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause 
emotional distress.”); see also Nelson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 621 S.W.2d 573, 575–
76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that attempts to collect a debt, even in a rude 
and insolent manner, are not extreme and outrageous conduct). 
 262 Champlin, 478 A.2d at 989. 
 263 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g, illus. 7 (1977) (providing an 
example of an overly-aggressive form and actionable form of debt collection); see also 
MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 729 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding 
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The few cases permitting plaintiffs to proceed on their IIED 
claims stemming from a lawyer’s attempts to collect a debt on behalf 
of a client have typically involved some combination of threats, false-
hoods, and misuse of the judicial system.  For example, a California 
appellate court held in Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre that a 
plaintiff had stated a claim when a law firm, in an attempt to collect a 
debt on behalf of client, falsely told a seventy-four-year-old woman 
that there was a bench warrant out for her arrest and that the firm 
would not recall the warrant until the debt was paid in full.
264
  In Perk 
v. Worden, a lawyer, seeking to collect a debt on behalf of a client, 
“blatantly lied” to the plaintiff so that she would not appear for a 
court hearing and he could obtain a default judgment against her.
265
  
In addition, the lawyer knowingly filed state actions against her in an 
incorrect venue and was verbally abusive to her on the telephone.
266
  
According to the court, the plaintiff stated a claim for extreme and 
outrageous conduct.
267
  Although both decisions are probably correct, 
neither offers much in the way of explanation as to why the conduct 
of the respective lawyers could be considered extreme and outra-
geous. 
b. IIED Claims Stemming from Attempts to Collect a Debt 
from a Client 
Lawyers have also faced IIED claims stemming from their aggres-
sive attempts to collect a fee from a former client.
268
  These cases in-
volve the same complexities and uncertainties as the cases described 
above, but with one additional wrinkle: the recipient of the threat in 
these cases is a former client. 
While the lawyer-client relationship may technically be over, 
there remains at least some element of a special relationship in the 
case of a lawyer and a former client.  Although the same level of trust 
 
that husband stated a claim for IIED based upon defendant’s attempts to collect a 
debt that resulted in wife’s suicide); Bennett v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Con., 549 
P.2d 393, 397 (Okla. Civ. App. 1976) (concluding plaintiff stated an IIED claim 
based upon bank employee’s abusive telephone calls attempting to collect a debt). 
 264 206 Cal. App. 3d 1513, 1518–19 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 265 475 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 266 Id.  
 267 Id. 
 268 See, e.g., Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying Califor-
nia law); Cummings v. Pinder, 574 A.2d 843, 845 (Del. 1990); Amstead v. McFarland, 
650 S.E.2d 737, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); see also Miller v. Stonehenge/Fasa-Texas, 
JDC, L.P., 993 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (involving IIED claim against attorney 
based on attorney’s invasion of privacy of debtor’s possessions). 
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may no longer exist, a client does not become a stranger—either as a 
practical or a legal matter—when the lawyer-client relationship con-
cludes.  For example, a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality remains even 
after the termination of the relationship.
269
  In addition, a lawyer is 
ethically prohibited from representing a new client in a matter that is 
the same or substantially related to the matter in which the lawyer 
formerly represented a client.
270
  The existence of special ethical obli-
gations regarding former clients perhaps explains why courts have 
been willing to allow IIED claims to proceed where they might not in 
other instances. 
For example, in an attempt to collect legal fees, the attorney in 
Moore v. Greene, a decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
subjected a former client to “a barrage of offensive and insulting re-
marks unbecoming a sane human being” in a series of letters.
271
  
Among other remarks, the attorney warned that he would “flay” the 
client and advised the client that if he was “too damn dumb to under-
stand what is said to you plainly, get smart.”
272
  The court concluded 
that the statements satisfied the extreme and outrageous conduct 
element of the client’s IIED claim, despite the general rule that in-
sults and threats do not rise to that level.
273
  Although there is little 
explanation from the court’s opinion as to why the insults and threats 
in this case rose to that level, one can perhaps infer that the fact that 
the insults and threats were directed at a former client may have in-
fluenced the decision. 
As a general rule, an attorney is not liable under an IIED theory 
for resorting to litigation in order to retain a fee, even where the fee 
agreement is determined to be unenforceable.
274
  But, prolonged 
abuse of the legal process against a former client through the use of 
vindictive and frivolous litigation has been found in at least one in-
stance to rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct if the 
 
 269 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2011). 
 270 Id. R. 1.9(a). 
 271 Moore, 431 F.2d at 591. 
 272 Id. at 591 n.4. 
 273 Id. at 591. 
 274 See Margrabe v. Sexter & Warmflash, P.C., No. 07-CV-2798, 2009 WL 361830, at 
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2009) (filing defamation action against client, allegedly in an 
attempt to pressure client to drop a counterclaim against lawyer in a fee dispute, did 
not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Amstead, 650 S.E.2d at 743 
(concluding that lawyer’s resort to litigation to retain his attorney’s fee did not 
amount to extreme and outrageous conduct).  
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abuse is prolonged.
275
  The fact that the attorney’s “vindictive, obstre-
perous, and dilatory tactics” were directed toward a former client 
seemed to influence the court’s view as to the reprehensibility of the 
lawyer’s actions.
276
 
Cummings v. Pinder, a Delaware case, illustrates the sometimes 
blurry line between a current client and a former client.
277
  The lawyer 
in Cummings helped his client obtain a settlement in the underlying 
matter.
278
  As part of a fee dispute, the lawyer caused a stop-payment 
order on a check issued by the other side in the underlying matter 
and endorsed to the client.
279
  As a result, the client overdrew her 
bank account and incurred bank charges.
280
  The client then sued on 
an IIED theory.
281
  Although an attorney-client relationship probably 
still existed as a technical matter at the time of the lawyer’s actions, 
the lawyer had essentially performed the duties for which he had 
been hired.  The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the jury 
was justified in concluding these actions were extreme and outra-
geous in light of the fact that they arose from “a relationship of ‘trust 
and confidence.’”
282
 
Another possible scenario involves the situation in which a law-
yer threatens to disclose confidential client information in order to 
collect a fee.  There appear to be few reported IIED cases involving 
this scenario.  However, there have been several disciplinary actions 
taken against lawyers for such action.
283
  Given the breach of loyalty 
such action would entail, it is easy to imagine a court classifying this 
conduct as extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim. 
 
 275 See In re DuBarry, 814 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (La. 2002) (awarding damages in IIED 
case stemming from lawyer’s use of “vindictive, obstreperous, and dilatory tactics” in 
the course of a long fee dispute with a client); In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d 326 (La. 
2000) (involving same case, but a different lawyer). 
 276 See In re DuBarry, 814 So. 2d at 1281 (“Most troubling is respondent’s exhibi-
tion of a complete indifference for the emotional distress inflicted on her client for a 
decade.”).   
 277 574 A.2d 843 (Del. 1990). 
 278 Id. at 845. 
 279 Id.  
 280 Id. 
 281 Id.    
 282 Id. 
 283 See Lindenbaum v. State Bar, 160 P.2d 9, 17 (Cal. 1945) (suspending lawyer for 
six months); In re Huffman, 983 P.2d 534, 549 (Or. 1999) (suspending lawyer for 
three years); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter, 985 P.2d 328, 342 (Wash. 
1999) (suspending lawyer for six months). 
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3. Threatening or Initiating Criminal Prosecution in 
Order to Gain an Advantage in a Civil Matter 
a. Threatening or Initiating Criminal Prosecution in 
Order to Gain an Advantage in a Civil Matter On 
Behalf of a Client 
One situation in which a lawyer’s debt collection attempts might 
conceivably cross the line into extreme and outrageous conduct is 
when a lawyer threatens a party with criminal prosecution in order to 
obtain an advantage in a civil proceeding on behalf of a client.
284
  
Closely related is the situation in which a lawyer initiates or attempts 
to initiate criminal proceedings against another in order to gain an 
advantage on behalf of a client.
285
  Both situations present difficult 
challenges. 
The legal profession has decidedly mixed views on whether 
threatening criminal prosecution in order to attain an advantage in a 
civil proceeding is beyond all bounds of accepted conduct for law-
yers.  Initially, the ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohi-
bited a lawyer from threatening to present criminal charges solely to 
obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
286
  At least one court concluded 
that a client who alleged a lawyer had violated this rule had stated a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
287
  However, 
when the ABA replaced the older Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it omitted the prohibi-
tion on threatening criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a 
civil proceeding.
288
  ABA Ethics Opinion 92-363 noted that the omis-
sion was deliberate and that such threats were permissible 
provided that the criminal matter is related to the civil claim, the 
lawyer has a well founded belief that both the civil claim and the 
possible criminal charges are warranted by the law and the facts, 
 
 284 See, e.g., Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (Ct. App. 1977). 
 285 See, e.g., Kalika v. Stern, 911 F. Supp. 594, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 286 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105 (1980). 
 287 Kinnamon, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 321.  Kinnamon’s reliance on the lawyer’s ethical 
violation as supporting a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct, and its refusal 
to extend the litigation privilege to the lawyer due to the ethical violation, have since 
been the subject of repeated criticisms among California courts.  See, e.g., Silberg v. 
Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 369 (Cal. 1990) (disapproving decisions refusing to extend 
absolute privilege to such cases); Ross v. Creel Printing & Publ’g Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 787 (Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting the notion that violation of an ethical rule equates 
to extreme and outrageous conduct).     
 288 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992). 
LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2012  6:07 PM 
2012] LAWYERS INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 101 
and the lawyer does not attempt to exert or suggest improper in-
fluence over the criminal process.
289
 
The opinion also noted, however, that if any of these precondi-
tions were not met, the lawyer’s actions would likely violate one or 
more separate ethics rules.
290
  In addition, the opinion noted that a 
lawyer’s threats could conceivably amount to extortion or compound-
ing under the criminal law.
291
  Finally, despite the ABA’s decision to 
omit the prohibition on threatening criminal prosecution when it 
promulgated the Model Rules, a near majority of jurisdictions have 
retained the prohibition.
292
  Thus, it is possible to imagine a lawyer 
who, in bad faith, threatens criminal prosecution in order to gain an 
advantage in a civil matter facing professional discipline and an IIED 
claim, regardless of whether a disciplinary rule specifically prohibited 
such action.  The fact that a lawyer violates a rule specifically prohibit-
ing threats of criminal prosecution would seem to increase the like-
lihood of a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct. 
 IIED cases involving a lawyer’s initiating or threatening to in-
itiate criminal prosecution in order to obtain an advantage present a 
particularly challenging issue.  Courts have sometimes been willing to 
recognize a nonlawyer’s threats of criminal prosecution in order to 
coerce a more favorable settlement as rising to the level of extreme 
and outrageous conduct.
293
  Similarly, some courts have been willing 
to conclude that making false reports of criminal activity against an 
individual may qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct,
294
 espe-
 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.10 (2010); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 5-100(A) (2010); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5(A) (2010); 
CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(7) (2010); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
8.4(g) (2010); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(g) (2010); GA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.4(h) (2010); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(i) (2010); IDAHO 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2010); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) 
(2010); KY. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f); LA. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 
8.4(g) (2010); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(e) (2010);  N.J. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.4(g) (2010);  N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2010); MASS. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(h) (2010); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.2(e) (2010); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5 (2010); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.04(b); 
VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5 (2010); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(i) 
(2010); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(c) (2010). 
 293 FDIC v. S. Prawer & Co., 829 F. Supp. 439, 450 (D. Me. 1992).  
 294 See, e.g., Mroz v. Lee, 5 F.3d 1016, 1019–20 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying Michigan 
law and concluding that defendant’s acts of falsely informing others that defendant 
engaged in criminal activities and using this misinformation to manipulate the legal 
system to plaintiff’s detriment could qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct). 
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cially if done by an individual occupying a position of trust or author-
ity.
295
  The fact that a lawyer commits these acts only complicates the 
analysis.  On the one hand, the fact that it is a lawyer—an individual 
with special responsibilities regarding the administration of justice—
who commits these acts arguably makes the acts more egregious.  On 
the other, a lawyer’s duty of diligent representation may cut against a 
finding of extreme and outrageous conduct. 
Generally, courts have come down on the diligent representa-
tion side of the conflict.  When a lawyer, with probable cause, threat-
ens criminal prosecution on behalf of a client, courts have been re-
luctant to classify such conduct as extreme and outrageous.
296
  At least 
one court has held that the absolute litigation privilege applies to 
such statements.
297
  But often there is little explanation as to how the 
court arrived at its conclusion that these threats do not amount to ex-
treme and outrageous conduct.  Courts have sometimes shielded law-
yers from IIED claims even where a lawyer is alleged to have knowing-
ly made a false statement about the plaintiff to law enforcement 
authorities.  In a Pennsylvania case, a husband alleged that his wife’s 
lawyer, in an attempt to gain an advantage in an anticipated child 
custody proceeding, told police that the father had sexually molested 
his own daughter and knew, or should have known, that the state-
ment was false.
298
  The court concluded, without explanation, that the 
father’s IIED complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss on 
the grounds that the alleged conduct was not extreme and outra-
geous as a matter of law.
299
  The court reached this conclusion despite 
 
 295 See, e.g., Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 139 (C.D. Cal. 1986) 
(concluding that police officers’ acts of making false reports of criminal activity on 
plaintiff’s part could qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965) (“[P]olice officers, school authorities, lan-
dlords, and collecting creditors have been held liable for extreme abuse of their po-
sition.”).  But see Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (Ct. App. 1972) 
(concluding that defendant’s false statements about plaintiff to authorities during 
criminal investigation did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct), 
overruled by 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
 296 See, e.g.,  Burton v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C., 355 S.E.2d 800, 803 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1987) (concluding that a lawyer who, in attempting to collect a debt on behalf 
of client, stated that client was considering filing criminal charges for the filing of an 
inaccurate financial statement did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct); 
see also Kalika v. Stern, 911 F. Supp. 594, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that law-
yer’s act of pursuing criminal charges related to civil representation was not extreme 
and outrageous conduct where lawyer had probable cause to believe there was a vi-
olation of law). 
 297 Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
 298 Motheral v. Burkhart, 583 A.2d 1180, 1189–90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 299 Id. at 1190. 
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the horrific nature of the false allegation and despite the fact that the 
lawyer’s actions in the case, as alleged, could potentially have sub-
jected the lawyer to significant disciplinary sanctions, including the 
suspension of her license.
300
  
b. Threatening Criminal Prosecution and Other 
Aggressive Attempts to Collect a Fee from a Former 
Client 
A lawyer who threatens criminal prosecution in an attempt to 
collect a fee might also potentially face an IIED claim.  Although 
there are few reported IIED cases involving this scenario, lawyers have 
faced professional discipline for engaging in this behavior.
301
  The fact 
that a lawyer has continuing ethical duties with respect to a former 
client may increase the likelihood that the lawyer’s actions would be 
found to be extreme and outrageous.  For example, a lawyer who 
threatens to disclose confidential information in order to obtain a 
warrant for a client’s arrest in connection with a fee dispute has argu-
ably engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct even absent an eth-
ical rule specifically prohibiting a lawyer from threatening criminal 
prosecution in order to obtain an advantage in a civil proceeding.
302
 
C. A Brief Summary 
At least three themes emerge from the preceding study of IIED 
cases involving lawyer-defendants.  First, plaintiffs only occasionally 
prevail.  Second, despite plaintiffs’ general lack of success, results are 
difficult to predict and clear standards as to what qualifies as extreme 
and outrageous conduct on the part of an attorney are elusive.  This 
lack of predictability stems, at least in part, from the failure of courts 
to articulate a meaningful standard for evaluating a lawyer’s miscon-
duct.  Third, despite this uncertainty, clients are more likely to be 
 
 300 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2011) (prohibiting a lawyer, in 
the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of ma-
terial fact); id. R. 4.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from using means that have no sub-
stantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person); cf. Cuya-
hoga City Bar Ass’n v. Wise, 842 N.E.2d 35 (Ohio 2006) (suspending lawyer for six 
months for threatening aunt with criminal prosecution for kidnapping in order to 
gain advantage in a custody proceeding where lawyer admitted he never suspected 
aunt of kidnapping). See generally Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct 
v. Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1996) (disbarring lawyer for making false accusa-
tions of criminal conduct against judges and lawyers in court filings). 
 301 See, e.g., In re Yarborough, 488 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. 1997). 
 302 Cf. People v. Farrant, 852 P.2d 452, 455 (Colo. 1993) (concluding that a law-
yer’s threat to disclose confidential client information in connection with a fee dis-
pute, standing alone, warranted suspension from the practice of law). 
LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2012  6:07 PM 
104 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:55 
successful on their IIED claims than are plaintiffs with no attorney-
client relationship with the defendant.  This is generally consistent 
with the outcomes in other IIED cases, in which plaintiffs with con-
tractual relationships with defendants are more likely to prevail.
303
 
These conclusions should not be surprising.  As a matter of con-
tract law, the existence of a contractual relationship imposes upon 
the parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
304
  And as a matter of 
tort law, courts could naturally be expected to infer from this a 
somewhat heightened standard of decent behavior and fairness when 
dealing with a contractual partner, the violation of which could more 
readily be characterized as “extreme and outrageous.”
305
  In the case 
of lawyers and their clients, there is not only a contractual relation-
ship but a relationship built upon “the utmost trust and confi-
dence.”
306
  In the case of lawyers and non-clients, the law governing 
lawyers has gone to great lengths to limit any sense on the part of 
non-clients that lawyers owe them any duty other than to refrain from 
intentionally harming them.
307
  Many of the non-clients who sue law-
yers for intentional infliction of emotional distress have an adversarial 
relationship with the lawyers in question, lawyers who owe a duty of 
zealous advocacy to their own clients.  Accordingly, courts appear to 
be inclined to require that a lawyer’s conduct be even more egregious 
than the typical IIED defendant in order to satisfy the “extreme and 
outrageous” element. 
Nor is it terribly surprising that the area lacks clear standards 
with regard to what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct on 
the part of a lawyer.  As discussed, IIED law is riddled with uncertain-
 
 303 In 1982, Professor Daniel Givelber concluded:  
When the parties have a pre-existing economic relationship based or 
apparently based on contract, courts are frequently willing to uphold 
determinations of outrageousness.  These cases reflect a common 
theme—they require a basic level of fair procedure and decency in 
dealings between people who occupy unequal bargaining positions and 
are bound (or apparently bound) by voluntary agreements.  When the 
parties are not bound by contract, the cases are fewer, the results more 
unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent.  
Givelber, supra note 6, at 63. 
 304 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 305 See Givelber, supra note 6, at 63 (noting that, in the case of parties with con-
tractual relationships, the cases “require a basic level of fair procedure and decen-
cy”). 
 306 Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 1981). 
 307 See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text; see also Yorgan v. Durkin, 715 
N.W.2d 160, 166–67 (Wis. 2006) (“[A]bsent fraud or certain policy considerations, 
an attorney is not liable to third parties for acts committed in the exercise of his du-
ties as an attorney.”). 
LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2012  6:07 PM 
2012] LAWYERS INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 105 
ty and vague standards.  The complexities involved in lawyer IIED 
cases only exacerbate the problem.  What is at least mildly surprising 
(and certainly disappointing) is the failure of courts to articulate any 
meaningful standards with regard to the extreme and outrageous de-
termination.  In light of the wealth of positive law and clear policy 
pronouncements concerning proper behavior on the part of lawyers, 
courts have at least some tools at their disposal to develop such stan-
dards.  Regrettably, the courts have largely failed to take advantage of 
them. 
V. A NEW APPROACH TO LAWYER IIED CASES 
As the foregoing discussion should illustrate, courts often en-
gage in exceptionally rigorous scrutiny of the alleged outrageousness 
of a lawyer’s conduct in IIED cases.  However, the standards that 
courts apply in these cases are far from clear.  If courts are going to 
engage in this type of close scrutiny, they should be clearer about to 
what standard a defendant’s conduct is being compared. 
Disciplinary rules establish standards of conduct and duties that 
lawyers owe to their clients.  Therefore, the fact that a lawyer’s con-
duct amounts to a violation of a disciplinary rule should be a relevant 
consideration in the outrageousness analysis.  However, for the rea-
sons discussed previously, the mere violation of a disciplinary rule is 
not always a reliable indicator of outrageousness.
308
  Courts should al-
so look to positive expressions of the policies underlying the discipli-
nary and legal rules governing lawyers’ conduct in an attempt to de-
termine whether a lawyer’s conduct may qualify as “extreme and 
outrageous.”  But, as discussed previously, even this approach may 
sometimes lead to contradictory or incomplete conclusions.
309
  Al-
though a completely satisfactory definition of “extreme and outra-
geous” conduct will probably always remain outside the reach of 
courts, when external standards exist that may aid in the determina-
tion, they should be utilized.  The following Part argues how, in addi-
tion to relying on disciplinary rules and the policy values underlying 
the law governing lawyers, courts may use the ABA Standards for Impos-
ing Lawyer Sanctions (“Standards”) and prior disciplinary decisions to 
help determine whether a lawyer’s conduct is extreme and outra-
geous. 
 
 308 See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. 
 309 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
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A. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct and the Sanction of Disbarment 
Disbarment is the ultimate professional sanction for a lawyer.
310
  
In deciding whether disbarment is the appropriate sanction for pro-
fessional misconduct, courts and disciplinary authorities frequently 
note the purpose of professional discipline is not primarily to punish 
an offending attorney.  Instead, professional discipline serves the 
goals of “protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the 
bar, preserving the integrity of the legal profession, and preventing 
similar conduct in the future.”
311
  Accordingly, disbarment is only ap-
propriate in the most serious cases—those cases in which an attor-
ney’s continued practice threatens those goals.
312
 
In describing what conduct merits the ultimate sanction of dis-
barment, courts and disciplinary authorities have used a variety of de-
scriptive terms.  Many of these terms would sound quite at home in 
the context of a decision involving a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  Courts have stated that disbarment is reserved for 
“extreme” misconduct,
313
 “outrageous” conduct,
314
 “atrocious acts,”
315
 
conduct that puts an attorney “beyond the bounds of what the . . . le-
gal community expects of its members”
316
 or that represents a “a wide 
 
 310 In re Morse, 7 A.3d 1259, 1266 (N.H. 2010). 
 311 Id.; see also In re Torres, No. 96–O–04035, 2000 WL 282930, at *12 (Cal. Bar Ct. 
Mar. 7, 2000) (“[T]he primary purposes of discipline are to protect the public, the 
courts, and the legal profession; to maintain the highest possible professional stan-
dards for attorneys; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.”).   
 312 See In re Sniadecki, 924 N.E.2d 109, 120 (Ind. 2010) (“Disbarment is reserved 
for the most serious misconduct.”). 
 313 In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396, 412 n.15 (D.C. 2006) (referring to dis-
barred lawyer’s misconduct as “extreme”); In re Disciplinary Action Against Kaszynski, 
620 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. 2001) (stating that “extreme client neglect and non-
communication” may warrant disbarment); In re Imbriani, 694 A.2d 1030, 1033 (N.J. 
1997) (concluding that disbarment was appropriate given finding that lawyer’s mis-
conduct was “extreme and extended”); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Tasker, 
9 P.3d 822, 832 (Wash. 2000) (concluding that disbarment was the appropriate sanc-
tion “given the extreme nature of the misconduct”). 
 314 In re Welcker, 701 So. 2d 186, 188 (La. 1997) (permanently disbarring attorney 
based on finding of “outrageous, inexcusable and contemptible” behavior); In re 
Breen, 552 A.2d 105, 116 (N.J. 1989) (concluding that lawyer’s “outrageous conduct” 
warranted disbarment); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Al’Uqdah, 792 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 
(Ohio 2003) (disbarring attorney based on lawyer’s “outrageous pattern of miscon-
duct”); In re Adams, 534 S.E.2d 278, 281 (S.C. 2000) (disbarring attorney based on 
“outrageous pattern of misappropriation”). 
 315 In re X, 577 A.2d 139, 140 (N.J. 1990) (“[R]espondent’s atrocious acts justify 
his disbarment.”). 
 316 Mississippi Bar v. Sweeney, 849 So. 2d 884, 890 (Miss. 2003) (Cobb, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
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departure” from the expectations of the legal profession,
317
 “the most 
egregious misconduct,”
318
 “intolerable conduct,”
319
 and conduct that 
manifests a willingness to violate “common decency” in pursuit of the 
lawyer’s goals.
320
  Summing up the decisional law about as well as one 
could hope for, one court has stated that “[t]he common thread that 
runs through cases resulting in disbarment is that the conduct is so 
offensive and obnoxious both to common decency and to principles 
of justice that there can be no other result.”
321
 
Tort law and the lawyer disciplinary process serve different pur-
poses.  However, the rationales underlying the standards of “extreme 
and outrageous” conduct and conduct warranting disbarment are the 
same.  Both standards address conduct that cannot be tolerated if so-
ciety is to function.  Lawyers play a fundamental role in the adminis-
tration of justice.
322
  As the Ohio Supreme Court noted while order-
ing the disbarment of a lawyer, “[a] civilized society cannot long 
remain without implicit confidence in those who occupy responsible 
positions of public trust, including . . . members of the Bar who are 
‘officers of the court.’”
323
  Therefore, conduct that warrants disbar-
ment is conduct that the legal profession and society more generally 
cannot tolerate if its legal institutions are to function.  It is conduct 
that is intolerable in a civilized society.  Stated differently, it is ex-
treme and outrageous conduct. 
 
 317 Commonwealth ex rel. Pike Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Stump, 57 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Ky. 
1933); see also In re Goldstein, 104 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ill. 1952) (Schaefer, J., dissent-
ing) (opining that disbarment is appropriate where attorney engages in “a wide de-
parture from the standards required of members of the legal profession”). 
 318 Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 891 N.E.2d 324, 340 (Ohio 2008); see also Law-
yer Disciplinary Bd. v. Coleman, 639 S.E.2d 882, 892 (W. Va. 2006) (“[D]isbarment is 
a sanction reserved for only the most egregious of disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 319 In re Witherspoon, 3 A.3d 496, 510–11 (N.J. 2010) (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the disbarment was an appropriate sanction for an attorney’s “intolera-
ble” misconduct); see also Fla. Bar v. Dove, 985 So. 2d 1001, 1019 (Fla. 2008) (stating 
that disbarment is appropriate for “intolerable acts of deception”); In re Morris, 241 
S.E.2d 911, 913  (S.C. 1978) (concluding that the lawyer’s “disregard of his clients’ 
interest in favor of his own is intolerable” and that disbarment was, therefore, appro-
priate). 
 320 In re Hirschfeld, 960 P.2d 640, 644 (Ariz. 1998); see also Copren v. State Bar, 
183 P.2d 833, 841–42 (Nev. 1947) (stating that disbarment is appropriate where ne-
cessary “to promote the maintenance of the proper decency . . . in the legal profes-
sion”). 
 321 In re Vincenti, 704 A.2d 927, 942–43 (N.J. 1998). 
 322 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011) (“[A lawyer is] “a public 
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”).  
 323 Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Fatica, 274 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ohio 1971); see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 13 (2011) (“Lawyers play a vital role in the preser-
vation of society.”) 
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The California State Bar Court (the court charged with ruling 
on disciplinary cases) has drawn a similar connection between ex-
treme and outrageous conduct in the IIED context and conduct war-
ranting disbarment.  In re Torres was a disciplinary case involving an 
attorney who engaged in an extended pattern of harassment against a 
client, including making over one hundred telephone calls to the 
client’s house, often late at night.
324
  In considering the appropriate 
discipline for the lawyer’s misconduct, the court relied heavily on the 
fact that the client had successfully sued the lawyer on an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress theory for the same conduct.
325
  Ulti-
mately, in the court’s view, what made the conduct intolerable was 
the fact that it was committed by a lawyer. 
It is also important to note the depravity of this misconduct in its 
relation to the legal profession.  Here is a lawyer that turns on his 
client, without provocation, through a pattern of harassment and 
the intentional infliction of serious emotional distress for the 
purpose of causing the client grief.  Such duplicitous conduct by a 
lawyer makes the legal profession not a highly essential aid to so-
ciety, but a detriment.
326
 
According to the California Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Profes-
sional Misconduct, the presumptive discipline in such cases is actual 
suspension or disbarment.
327
 
B. The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and IIED 
Claims 
The goal of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions is to 
establish clear and appropriate standards of professional discipline.
328
  
 
 324 No. 96–O–04035, 2000 WL 282930, at *3 (Cal. Bar Ct. Mar. 7, 2000). 
 325 Id. at *6–7. 
 326 Id. at *11. 
 327 Id. at *12.  The court imposed a sanction of three years’ actual suspension with 
a condition that the lawyer undergo mental health counseling.  Id. at *14.  The court 
rejected (incorrectly, I would argue) the sanction of disbarment suggested by the 
hearing officer on the grounds that the lawyer’s conduct was not as bad as similar 
conduct on the part of other lawyers that had resulted in disbarment, and the lawyer 
did not display a “total lack of remorse.”  Id. at *13 (emphasis in original).  Neither of 
these seem like particularly strong reasons to allow a lawyer who terrorized his client 
to the point that she became so emotionally unstable that she lost her job to contin-
ue to practice.  Id. at *10.      
 328 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 1.3 (1992);  Moore, supra 
note 74, at 18.  The ABA has also produced the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary En-
forcement, which are less specific than the Standards and which “address the lawyer 
disciplinary process holistically.”  Jennifer Carpenter & Thomas Cluderay, Implications 
of Online Disciplinary Records: Balancing the Public’s Interest In Openness with Attorneys’ 
Concerns for Maintaining Flexible Self-Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 735 n.14 
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Most states have adopted the Standards.
329
  While state courts vary in 
terms of how frequently or rigorously they actually apply the Stan-
dards in practice,
330
 the Standards have become well established since 
their publication in 1986. 
The Standards provide courts and disciplinary authorities with 
guidance in determining the appropriate sanction after a lawyer has 
been found to have engaged in a violation of a disciplinary rule.  In 
devising the Standards, the authors collected data regarding “what 
types of sanctions have been imposed for similar misconduct in re-
ported cases.”
331
  Thus, to some extent, the Standards reflect the legal 
profession’s collective judgment concerning the seriousness of differ-
ent types of misconduct.  The Standards also adopt what one author 
has described as a two-tiered analysis to the issue of sanctions.
332
  Ac-
cording to the Preface, when assessing the appropriate sanction, a 
disciplinary authority should look “first at the ethical duty and to 
whom it is owed, and then at the lawyer’s mental state and the 
amount of injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.”
333
 
According to the authors’ description of the analytical frame-
work, “[i]n determining the nature of the ethical duty violated, the 
standards assume that the most important ethical duties are those ob-
ligations which a lawyer owes to clients.”
334
  Thus, in general, a viola-
tion of an ethical duty owed to a client is more likely to lead to se-
rious disciplinary sanctions than a violation of a duty owed to the 
public, the legal system, or the legal profession.
335
  Examples of duties 
owed to clients include the duty of loyalty (including preserving 
client property, maintaining client confidences, and avoiding con-
 
(2009).  Because one of the premises of this Article is that greater clarity and specific-
ity is needed in the IIED context, the Standards provide a more useable standard.   
 329 See Rachna K. Dhanda, Note, When Attorneys Become Convicted Felons: The Question 
of Discipline by the Bar, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 723, 731 n.53 (1995) (stating that with 
the exceptions of New York, the District of Columbia, and Mississippi, virtually every 
jurisdiction has “substantially adopted provisions of the Standards”).  
 330 See, e.g., In re LaMartina, 38 So. 3d 266, 271 (La. 2010) (explicitly referencing 
and applying the Standards); Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Allison, 284 S.W.3d 316, 
327 (Tenn. 2009) (same); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Preszler, 232 P.3d 
1118, 1126 (Wash. 2010) (same). 
 331 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface, at 3 (1986). 
 332 Rachel Tarko Hudson, Pick Your Poison: Abuse of Legal Versus Illegal Substances as 
Mitigation in Attorney Discipline Cases, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 913 (2009). 
 333 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface, at 3 (1986).  
 334 Id. at 9. 
 335 See generally id. (explaining that in considering the nature of the ethical duty 
violated, one must inquire whether the duty was owed to the client, the public, the 
legal system, or the profession). 
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flicts of interest), the duty of diligence, the duty of competence, and 
the duty of candor.
336
  Dishonest conduct could be a violation of a du-
ty owed to the clients, the public, the legal system, or the legal profes-
sion, depending upon to whom the misrepresentation is directed.
337
 
The next step in the analysis is to determine the lawyer’s mental 
state and the amount of injury caused by the misconduct.  Not surpri-
singly, the Standards explain that “[t]he most culpable mental state is 
that of intent.”
338
  In determining the appropriate sanction for a viola-
tion of a disciplinary rule, one must also consider the extent of the 
actual or potential injury the lawyer’s misconduct caused, with op-
tions ranging from “little or no injury” to “serious injury.”
339
  Finally, 
the Standards suggest consideration of any aggravating or mitigating 
factors, such as a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, 
the vulnerability of the victim, or illegal conduct.
340
 
The Standards then apply this framework to various ethical 
breaches and lay out the presumptive sanction in each instance.  For 
example, the failure to preserve a client’s property is a breach of duty 
to the client—the most serious type of breach.
341
  As a result, 
“[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly con-
verts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client.”
342
 
Courts can easily apply the general analytical framework of the 
Standards to IIED cases involving lawyers.  In some respects, the Stan-
dards already reflect the general approach of courts in IIED cases in-
volving lawyers.  Lawyer misconduct directed at a client is considered 
the most serious type of disciplinary offense under the Standards.
343
  
Due to the relationship of trust between lawyer and client, such mis-
conduct is also more likely to amount to extreme and outrageous 
conduct than misconduct directed at a non-client.  Disbarment is 
more likely under the Standards where a lawyer acts with intent and 
 
 336 Id. at 5. 
 337 Id.  
 338 Id. at 6. 
 339 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6 (1986).  The standards define 
“potential injury” as harm “that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer’s 
misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably 
have resulted from the lawyer’s misconduct.”  Id. at 7. 
 340 Id. at 11 & Standard 9. 
 341 See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
 342 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.11 (1986). 
 343 See id. at 5 (“In determining the nature of the ethical duty violated, the stan-
dards assume that the most important ethical duties are those obligations which a 
lawyer owes to clients.”). 
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serious injury results.  Similarly, the IIED tort requires either intent 
or recklessness and “serious injury” in the form of severe emotional 
distress. 
Application of the Standards to lawyer IIED cases would add 
something new to the existing approach to evaluating IIED claims.  
The Standards provide more concrete analytical standards by classify-
ing various forms of attorney misconduct and assessing the serious-
ness of each.  The Standards also make value judgments regarding the 
seriousness (or outrageousness) of a lawyer’s misconduct, based upon 
prior decisional law.  These judgments as to which offenses are par-
ticularly egregious may be particularly relevant for courts seeking to 
assess the outrageousness of a lawyer’s misconduct.  Thus, for exam-
ple, the Standards explain that disbarment is generally appropriate in 
the case of intentional conversion of client property that leads to in-
jury.
344
  Notably, the Standards make a value judgment about the se-
riousness of this type of misconduct by only requiring “injury” rather 
than “serious injury” as it does in most other cases before concluding 
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.  This approach provides 
a level of specificity and concreteness lacking in IIED cases. 
In addition, the Standards reflect the common-sense notion that 
the offensiveness or outrageousness of an action may be heightened 
by the injury or potential injury that the actor’s conduct causes.  For 
instance, a lawyer who abandons her practice without notice to the 
client, thereby leaving the client with no legal remedy, has caused se-
rious injury.  The Standards make clear that disbarment is appropriate 
in such a case.
345
  Outside the disciplinary context, courts have been 
more willing to overlook their traditional reluctance to permit emo-
tional distress damages when a defendant’s conduct results in harm 
or potential harm that is especially likely to produce emotional dis-
tress.  For example, while emotional distress damages are typically not 
available in a breach of contract action, the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts provides that emotional distress damages are permissible 
when “the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emo-
tional disturbance was a particularly likely result”
346
 
This is true for the tort law governing lawyers as well.  For in-
stance, while many courts are unwilling to allow recovery for emo-
tional distress damages in malpractice actions, an exception often ex-
ists when a client is incarcerated or endures a similar loss of liberty as 
 
 344  STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.11 (1986). 
 345 Id. Standard 4.41(a). 
 346 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (1981). 
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a result of a lawyer’s malpractice.
347
  Similarly, the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts notes that the fact that a defendant knows that an individual is 
particularly susceptible to emotional distress is a factor that may lead 
to a finding of outrageousness.
348
  Thus, in many instances, a defen-
dant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous because it was committed 
with full knowledge that it could lead to serious injury, which in turn 
could be expected to result in severe emotional distress. The Stan-
dards reflect this approach in directing courts and disciplinary au-
thorities to consider the harm or potential harm caused by a lawyer’s 
misconduct. 
Thus, the standards for extreme and outrageous conduct on the 
part of a lawyer for purposes of an IIED claim and the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions should be coterminous.  In making the ini-
tial determination as to whether a lawyer’s conduct was sufficiently 
egregious to submit the issue of outrageousness to the jury or to qual-
ify as extreme and outrageous as a matter of law (in those jurisdic-
tions where this is a question of law), courts should rely on the Stan-
dards.  If disbarment is the presumptive sanction for the lawyer’s 
misconduct under the Standards, a court should submit the case to 
the jury (assuming there are triable issues regarding the other ele-
ments of the IIED claim) with the instruction that the jury may draw 
an inference of outrageousness from the fact that the lawyer’s con-
duct satisfies the disbarment threshold.  Where the question of out-
rageousness is one for the court, a court should, in the absence of any 
mitigating circumstances, conclude that a lawyer’s misconduct is ex-
treme and outrageous when disbarment is the presumptive sanction 
for the misconduct.
349
 
A jurisdiction’s prior disciplinary decisions may also aid in the 
extreme and outrageous analysis.  One of the purposes of the discip-
linary process is to educate other lawyers, thereby deterring future 
misconduct.
350
  Thus, existing disciplinary decisions may serve to put 
lawyers on notice as to the permissible bounds of conduct.  Where 
prior disciplinary decisions have established clear markers of conduct 
 
 347 E.g., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987); 3 MALLEN & 
SMITH, supra note 9, § 21:11, at 38. 
 348 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965). 
 349 Under this approach, if a disciplinary proceeding has already been completed, 
the fact that a lawyer has been found to have violated a rule or that the sanction of 
disbarment has been recommended or imposed would have whatever evidentiary ef-
fect the jurisdiction gives to such evidence in other contexts.  Thus, a prior discipli-
nary decision would not necessarily have any automatic effect on the plaintiff’s tort 
claim against the lawyer. 
 350 See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 1.1 cmt. (1986). 
LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2012  6:07 PM 
2012] LAWYERS INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 113 
that crosses the line into conduct “so offensive and obnoxious both to 
common decency and to principles of justice” that disbarment is pre-
sumptively appropriate, courts should rely upon them in deciding 
whether conduct qualifies as extreme and outrageous.  By linking the 
outrageousness and disbarment standards, courts can draw upon the 
wealth of disciplinary decisions and draw more meaningful compari-
sons between conduct.  Courts would not be limited to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts’ vague “beyond all possible bounds of decency” stan-
dard, nor would they be forced to draw comparisons between a law-
yer’s conduct and that of a doctor, a teacher, or business person in 
IIED cases.  Instead, in assessing whether a lawyer’s conduct was ex-
treme and outrageous, courts could compare apples to apples. 
One admitted weakness of this approach is that sometimes dis-
ciplinary authorities and courts do not impose the sanction of dis-
barment when the Standards would seem to call for this result.351  
While disbarment should be rare, 
352
 it is perhaps even rarer than it 
should be.
353
  Thus, there are undoubtedly numerous situations in 
which the bar has been set so high in the disciplinary context that a 
finding of extreme and outrageous conduct would be unlikely if 
courts simply compared the conduct of the lawyers in question.
354
  In 
 
 351 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.   
 352 See generally Roger W. Badeker, Struck Off: The Path to Disbarment, 64 J. KAN. B.A. 
24, 26 (1995) (“[D]isbarment is a rare sanction.”). 
 353 Michael S. Frisch, No Stone Left Unturned: The Failure of Attorney Self-Regulation in 
the District of Columbia, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 345 (2005) (referring to the D.C. 
Board of Professional Responsibility’s “institutional reluctance to impose disbarment 
in cases where the client has been subjected to gross mistreatment”). 
 354 See, e.g., In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d 326 (La. 2000) (involving a lawyer who, over 
the course of ten years, engaged in vindictive and dilatory behavior in a fee dispute 
with a client and who, by his own admission, falsely countersued the client for attor-
ney’s fees not owed); see also In re DuBerry, 814 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (La. 2002) (involv-
ing same case).  In prolonging the litigation, the lawyer misled the client to believe 
that she could lose all of the proceeds she had previously received.  Id. at 1281.   As a 
result, the client was afraid to spend any of the proceeds, despite the fact that “she 
was, at times, in dire need of the funds.”  Id.  None of the attorney’s numerous coun-
ter actions were deemed meritorious.  Id. at 1276.  A lower court found the lawyer 
liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the lawyer’s abuse of 
the legal process and knowledge of the former client’s vulnerability.  Id.  In the dis-
ciplinary proceeding against the lawyer, the disciplinary board concluded that in ad-
dition to violating his duties to the public and the legal system, the lawyer had vi-
olated his duty to his client, In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d at 331–32,  the most serious type 
of infraction.  The board concluded that disbarment was the baseline sanction for 
the lawyer’s misconduct, based on the fact that the lawyer’s actions “were knowing 
and intentional, and caused a great amount of actual injury.”  Id. at 331; cf. 
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.2 Commentary (1986) (stat-
ing that disbarment is appropriate where a lawyer intentionally misuses the legal 
process “to benefit the lawyer or another when the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or 
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addition, sometimes lesser sanctions are imposed due to the presence 
of mitigating factors that may not be present in other cases.  Thus, to 
the extent there is a conflict between the proper presumptive result 
stemming from an application of the Standards and prior results in 
disciplinary cases, application of the Standards should prevail. 
C. Applying the Approach to Lawyer IIED Cases 
Regardless of whether courts formally put lawyer IIED cases and 
lawyer disciplinary cases on the same analytical track in terms of judg-
ing the outrageousness of a lawyer’s conduct, utilizing aspects of the 
approach of the Standards would be beneficial.  It would certainly 
help provide needed doctrinal clarity in the area.  The following sec-
tion examines how the approach might work in practice. 
355
 
1. Liability to Clients 
a. Incompetence and Lack of Diligence 
The Standards impose a high standard for disbarment in the case 
of mere incompetence.  According to Standard 4.51, absent aggravat-
ing circumstances, “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a 
lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not un-
 
potentially serious injury to a party”).   Indeed, the board was unable to find “any 
prior case dealing with ‘such egregious conduct.’”  In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d at 331.  
Yet, the lawyer had no prior disciplinary record, so the board concluded that this mi-
tigating factor warranted a reduction in the sanction imposed to suspension for three 
years.  Id.  On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court approved the recommended 
sanction, despite its conclusion that “[a] review of the jurisprudence of this state in-
dicates there are no decisions involving vexatious litigation rising to the magnitude 
of that perpetuated by respondent” and that the baseline sanction for similar mis-
conduct in other jurisdictions was disbarment.  Id. at 332.  In addition to the lawyer’s 
lack of a prior record, the court noted that the lawyer had cooperated with the dis-
ciplinary process (which, of course, he was ethically required to do anyway) and had 
been subject to significant monetary sanctions.  Id.  Yet, a quick glance at the Stan-
dards reveals at least five relevant aggravating factors: the lawyer’s dishonest or selfish 
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victim, and 
substantial experience in the practice of law.  STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS Standard 9.22 (1986).  Thus, one has difficulty imagining what it would 
take for a first-time offender to be disbarred in Louisiana for abusing the legal 
process as part of a fee dispute with a client. 
 355 Although not addressed in this Article, potential IIED claims might also exist 
based on other forms of misconduct, such as a lawyer’s conversion of client property, 
see STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.11 (1986) (“Disbarment is 
generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client.”), and dishonesty or fraud directed at a client, 
id. Standard 4.61 (“Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious 
injury or potentially serious injury to a client.”). 
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derstand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and 
the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client.”
356
  
While it is possible to imagine a scenario in which a lawyer acts reck-
lessly by undertaking action in full awareness of the fact that the law-
yer does not understand “the most basic fundamental legal doctrines 
or procedures,” such cases are likely to be rare. 
The standard for disbarment on the basis of lack of diligence is 
decidedly lower.  Absent aggravating circumstances, disbarment is 
generally appropriate when “a lawyer knowingly fails to perform ser-
vices for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
client.”
357
  Violation of this standard should likewise amount to prima 
facie evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct. 
A lawyer’s duty of diligent representation is one of the funda-
mental values of the legal profession.
358
  A lawyer who knowingly fails 
to act on behalf of a client has violated the trust of that client, and, 
simultaneously, engaged in an extreme departure from the standards 
of the profession.  Where that action causes serious or potentially se-
rious injury to the client (such as imprisonment), 
359
the lawyer’s viola-
tion is compounded.  Accordingly, “outrageous” is hardly too strong a 
term to describe the lawyer’s conduct in such instances. 
b. Demands for Sexual Favors 
A lawyer who attempts to persuade a client to enter into a sex-
for-services arrangement has engaged in a violation of a duty to a 
client, the most serious type of ethical breach.  Courts have characte-
rized such action in a variety of ways; however, the common thread is 
that the conduct amounts to a violation of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.  
In disciplining lawyers for this sort of behavior, courts have con-
cluded that sexual harassment of a client amounts to creating a con-
flict of interest: a lawyer who harasses a client in this manner places 
 
 356 Id. Standard 4.51. 
 357 Id. Standard 4.41(b). Suspension is appropriate where the lawyer knowingly 
fails to perform services but the injury to the client is less severe.  Id. Standard 
4.42(a); see also In re Johnson, 444 N.E.2d 153, 155 (Ill. 1982) (suspending lawyer who 
failed to enter a divorce decree for over three years).  See generally Clemencia v. Mit-
chell, 956 A.2d 76, 80 (D.C. 2008) (“[W]e have held that where an attorney’s neg-
lectful failure . . . in handling a client’s case . . . amount[s] to conduct outrageously 
in violation of . . . [the attorney’s] implicit duty to devote reasonable efforts in 
representing his client, it may warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
 358 See, e.g., Fred Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1303, 1315–18 (1995). 
 359 See Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984); supra notes 145–54 and ac-
companying text. 
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“his own prurient interests above those of his clients.”
360
  In addition, 
a lawyer who uses the threat of abandoning a client unless the client 
consents to a sexual relationship may also violate a lawyer’s duty of 
diligence by failing to provide due notice to a client and failing to 
protect a client’s interests upon withdrawing from representation.
361
  
In the process, the lawyer’s multiple violations of professional respon-
sibility may jeopardize the client’s interests, thereby creating the po-
tential for serious injury.  Disbarment in these kinds of cases is not 
uncommon.
362
  Accordingly, such conduct should ordinarily qualify as 
extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim. 
c. Permitting or Concealing Conflicts of Interest and 
Other Breaches of Loyalty 
i. Conflicts of Interest 
Standard 4.31 addresses when disbarment is appropriate based 
upon a lawyer’s conflict of interest.  In the case of a lawyer with a con-
flict of interest involving a current client, disbarment is generally ap-
propriate when the lawyer knows of the conflict, continues the repre-
sentation with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes 
serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
363
  In the case of a con-
flict involving a former client, disbarment is generally appropriate 
when the lawyer “knowingly uses information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.”
364
 
Again, the bar for disbarment is set high in the case of permit-
ting conflicts of interest.  A lawyer must knowingly betray a client’s 
trust for the benefit of the lawyer or another and the betrayal must 
result in serious or potentially serious injury.  This is most likely to be 
 
 360 In re Witherspoon, 3 A.3d 496, 500 (N.J. 2010); see also In re Piatt, 951 P.2d 889, 
891 (Ariz. 1997) (stating that such conduct amounts to a conflict of interest because 
the lawyer’s action “serves the lawyer’s interest and not the client’s”). 
 361 See In re Estate of Brandon, 902 P.2d 1299, 1318 n.21 (Alaska 1995); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2011); STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS Standard 4.51(a) (1986). 
 362 See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 
N.W.2d 682, 703–04 (Iowa 2006) (indefinitely suspending lawyer for engaging in 
“sex-for-fees arrangement”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423, 
451 (Md. 2004) (disbarring attorney for, inter alia, threatening to withdraw from re-
presentation unless consented to sexual contact); see also Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Hall, 969 A.2d 953, 970 (Md. 2009) (suspending indefinitely attorney 
who engaged in sexual relationship with client knowing her fragile emotional state). 
 363 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.31 (1986). 
 364 Id. 
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the case where a lawyer “exploit[s] the lawyer-client relationship by 
acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary in-
terest adverse to a client without the client’s understanding or con-
sent.”
365
  In light of the fundamental role that the duty of loyalty plays 
in the practice of law, conduct satisfying ABA Standard 4.31 should 
ordinarily qualify as extreme and outrageous. 
ii. Other Breaches of Loyalty 
Some of the other previously-discussed examples of breaches of 
loyalty—such as lying to clients or refusing to allow a client to set-
tle
366
—that have led to IIED claims actually involve a breach of the 
duty of diligence as well as a breach of loyalty.  For example, the 
Standards treat a lawyer’s breach of the duty of proper communica-
tion with a client as a violation of the duty of diligence.
367
  As honesty 
is also an essential component of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty to a client, 
both duties are implicated when a lawyer lies to a client.
368
  Depend-
ing on the seriousness of the injury caused or risked, it is conceivable 
that lying to a client could amount to extreme and outrageous con-
duct.
369
  Consideration of the sanctions imposed in similar discipli-
nary cases may also aid a court in making this determination in close 
cases.
370
 
These kinds of scenarios also illustrate how courts can rely on 
the policies underlying the law governing lawyers to aid in the ex-
treme and outrageousness determination.  For example, clients have 
 
 365 Id. Standard 4.3 Commentary (noting that it is rare that an attorney knowingly 
uses information relating to representation of a former client with the intent to ben-
efit the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client). 
 366 See, e.g., Green v. Leibowitz, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App. Div. 1979); see also Single-
ton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970); supra notes 196–204 and accompany-
ing text. 
 367 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9 (1986). 
 368 See In re Brousseau, 697 A.2d 1079, 1080 (R.I. 1997) (concluding that lawyer 
who lied to client about status of claim violated duties of diligence and communica-
tion and stating that “[a]n attorney who intentionally lies to the client about the sta-
tus of the client’s claim violates his fiduciary duty of honesty to the client”). 
 369 Cf. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.61 (1986) (“Dis-
barment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the 
intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential serious 
injury to a client.”). 
 370 Cf. Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 1999) (suspending lawyer 
who lied to client about status of matter); In re Mays, 495 S.E.2d 30, 31 (Ga. 1998) 
(disbarring lawyer with prior disciplinary history who allowed statute of limitations to 
run and lied to client about status). 
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an absolute right to decide whether to settle a matter.
371
  A provision 
in a fee agreement that seeks to limit that right may be declared un-
enforceable in violation of public policy.
372
  Given the importance 
that the law governing lawyers attaches to a client’s right to settle, it is 
not surprising that courts have sometimes imposed significant discip-
linary sanctions against lawyers who have sought to deny clients that 
right.
373
  Where a lawyer’s refusal to permit a client to settle is coupled 
with other forms of misconduct and causes or risks serious injury, a 
reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the lawyer’s conduct is 
extreme and outrageous. 
d. Disclosure of Confidential Information 
Standard 4.2 deals with the failure to preserve a client’s confi-
dences.  The standard focuses on whether the lawyer discloses confi-
dential information for the lawyer’s own benefit and whether the 
client was injured or put at risk of injury by the disclosure: “Disbar-
ment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to bene-
fit the lawyer or another, knowingly reveals information relating to 
representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be dis-
closed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a 
client.”
374
  Again, given the fundamental role that client confidentiali-
ty plays in the practice of law, “extreme and outrageous” is hardly too 
strong a term to describe a lawyer’s actions that satisfy ABA Standard 
4.2. 
In addition, this is a situation in which the rules of professional 
conduct and the expressions of policy underlying the law governing 
lawyers may provide courts with meaningful guidance in difficult cas-
es.  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and various state codes 
contain clear statements of policy as to the fundamental importance 
of maintaining client confidences.
375
  Courts view the duty of confi-
dentiality as being essential to the administration of justice.
376
  Moreo-
ver, Model Rule 1.6 and its state equivalents delineate with some pre-
 
 371 E.g., Barnes v. Quigley, 49 A.2d 467, 468 (D.C. 1946); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2011).  
 372 Long, supra note 45, at 312. 
 373 See, e.g., In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ind. 1997) (suspending lawyer 
who included a provision in fee agreement that limited client’s right to settle); In re 
Wysolmerski, 702 A.2d 73, 75 (Vt. 1997) (suspending lawyer who settled matter with-
out client’s permission). 
 374 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS  Standard 4.21 (1986). 
 375 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2011). 
 376 See, e.g., Port of Portland v. Or. Ctr. for Envtl. Health, 243 P.3d 102, 106 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2010). 
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cision the scope of permissible disclosure.
377
  Model Rule 1.6(a) is 
clear that a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality applies not just to privi-
leged information but to all information relating to the representa-
tion of a client.
378
  Model Rule 1.6(b) lists the various exceptions to 
that duty.
379
  Given the importance the legal profession and the public 
attach to a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality and the potential harm 
that may result to a client due to a breach, a court may be justified in 
concluding that an intentional violation of this duty might amount to 
extreme and outrageous conduct. 
2. Liability to Non-Clients 
Under the approach described in this Article, analysis of a non-
client’s IIED claim against a lawyer would proceed in essentially the 
same manner as that discussed in the preceding section.  The Stan-
dards treat lawyer misconduct involving breach of a duty to a non-
client as presumptively less serious than misconduct involving 
clients.
380
  Accordingly, disbarment and findings that a lawyer’s con-
duct is extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim should 
be uncommon in such cases. 
In the case of litigation-related misconduct, reliance on the 
Standards may be especially helpful insofar as the Standards already 
take into account what weight the policy of zealous advocacy should 
carry in establishing appropriate sanctions for misconduct.  Thus, 
courts would not be limited to high-level, abstract discussions of how 
to balance the goals of zealous advocacy and civility and respect for 
the legal process in considering the appropriate discipline. 
Courts and disciplinary authorities have generally only imposed 
the ultimate sanction of disbarment for litigation-related misconduct 
when a lawyer has abused the legal process through a pattern of filing 
frivolous motions
381
 or subverted the trial process by attempting to 
 
 377 See generally Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 
1985) (noting the use of professional standards to establish the fiduciary’s duty of 
confidentiality). 
 378 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011). 
 379 Id. R. 1.6(b). 
 380 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface (1986); see supra note 335 
and accompanying text. 
 381 See In re Crumpacker, 383 N.E.2d 36, 52 (Ind. 1978) (disbarring attorney based 
on pattern of filing harassing litigation and making discourteous statements to op-
posing parties and lawyers); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 
Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515, 523 (Iowa 1996) (disbarring attorney for filing frivolous 
lawsuits and making false accusations of criminal conduct against other lawyers and 
judges); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanai, 225 P.3d 203, 212 (Wash. 2009) 
(disbarring attorney based on pattern of filing frivolous motions); see also In re Discip-
LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2012  6:07 PM 
120 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:55 
commit fraud upon the court or similar misconduct.
382
  Disbarment 
for incivility is even less common, with public reprimands being more 
typical.
383
  Although incivility might violate a disciplinary rule, it rarely 
causes or risks serious injury—the outcome typically required under 
the Standards before disbarment is appropriate in the case of a viola-
tion of a duty owed to one other than a client.
384
 
The approach would also work in other IIED cases involving 
non-client claims.  Many of the IIED cases stemming from a lawyer’s 
attempt to collect a debt involve some type of dishonesty, harassment, 
or misuse of the legal system.
385
  The Standards address these forms of 
misconduct in various ways that can be applied by courts in a consis-
tent fashion.
386
  Particularly in the case of a lawyer who misuses the le-
gal system, courts often emphasize the special policy concerns in-
volved when a lawyer engages in such action.
387
  Thus, in close cases, 
 
linary Proceeding Against Sanai, 225 P.3d at 210 (Chambers, J., dissenting) (arguing in 
favor of disbarment where lawyer’s conduct in litigation was described by trial judge 
as “an indescribable abuse of legal process [involving] the most abusive and obstruc-
tive litigation tactics this Court has ever encountered”). 
 382 See Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108, 123 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the court 
will typically disbar a lawyer who intentionally deceives the court); N.C. State Bar v. 
Talford, 556 S.E.2d 344, 353 (N.C. 2001) (“The North Carolina State Bar has also 
disbarred attorneys who demonstrated an intention to perpetrate a fraud upon the 
court, subvert the trial process, or disrupt the court’s functioning.”); see also 
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.11 (1986) (providing that 
where a lawyer’s litigation-related misconduct involves fraud upon a court, disbar-
ment is generally appropriate when the lawyer’s actions cause “serious or potentially 
serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse ef-
fect on the legal proceeding”).   
 383 See In re Ramunno, 625 A.2d 248, 250 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (publicly repri-
manding lawyer for use of profanity and insulting conduct toward opposing coun-
sel); In re Goude, 374 S.E.2d 496, 497 (S.C. 1988) (publicly reprimanding lawyer for 
engaging in discourteous behavior in court). 
 384 See Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, No. SC08-689, 2010 WL 2517995, at *5 n.3 (Fla. June 24, 
2010) (reducing recommended sanction of disbarment to suspension due to lack of 
evidence that respondent’s conduct caused serious or potentially serious harm). 
 385 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
 386 According to the Standards, disbarment is appropriate in cases of abuse of the 
legal process where the lawyer intentionally misuses the legal process “to benefit the 
lawyer or another when the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potentially serious in-
jury to a party, or serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.”  
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.2 cmt. (1986). 
 387 See, e.g., In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322 n.1 (1st Cir. 1973) (“Lawyers have an 
obligation as officers of the court not to indulge in any of these practices.”); Fla. Bar 
v. Rightmyer, 616 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. 1993) (“We can conceive of no ethical viola-
tion more damaging to the legal profession and process than lying under oath . . . .  
An officer of the court who knowingly and deliberately seeks to corrupt the legal 
process can logically expect to be excluded from that process”). 
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courts can draw upon such statements to help focus the inquiry as to 
the extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct. 
Threatening or initiating criminal prosecution in an attempt to 
gain an advantage in a civil proceeding presents a slightly more com-
plicated problem.  In those jurisdictions where no disciplinary rule 
prohibits this behavior, the jurisdiction has made clear that such be-
havior is within the permissible bounds of the practice of law.
388
  
Thus, a lawyer who takes such action in good faith should not be sub-
ject to IIED liability. 
When, however, a jurisdiction has a disciplinary rule in place 
prohibiting such conduct, or when the lawyer lacks a good faith belief 
that criminal charges are warranted, discipline is appropriate.  If a 
lawyer’s threats or acts amount to criminal conduct involving “inten-
tional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
misrepresentation, fraud, [or] extortion,” disbarment would be ap-
propriate under the Standards even absent any injury to the opposing 
party.
389
  Hence, such conduct should also be prima facie extreme 
and outrageous.  Similarly, threatening or initiating criminal pro-
ceedings without a good faith belief as to the charges has been found 
to violate the disciplinary rule prohibiting conduct having no sub-
stantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden another.
390
  
This implicates a lawyer’s duty to the legal system as an officer of the 
court and may amount to abuse of the legal process.
391
  Where serious 
injury or potential injury (such as arrest or relinquishment of a legal 
right) results, disbarment is appropriate;
392
 thus, such action should 
also be considered extreme and outrageous.
393
  Similarly, the Stan-
dards list the vulnerability of the victim as an aggravating factor in de-
termining the appropriate level of discipline.
394
  The fact that a lawyer 
has threatened or initiated criminal prosecution against a former 
 
 388 See supra notes 288–92 (discussing ABA Ethics Opinion 92-363).  
 389 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 5.11(a) (1986). 
 390 See, e.g., La. State Bar Ass’n v. Harrington, 585 So. 2d 514, 520 (La. 1990); Ro-
bertson’s Case, 626 A.2d 397, 401 (N.H. 1993); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. 
Comm., Ethics Op. No. 03-04, ¶ 16 (2003), available at 
http://www.utahbar.org/rules_ops_pols/ethics_opinions/op_03_04.html. 
 391 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.0 (1986). 
 392 Id. Standard 6.21. 
 393 Threatening or initiating criminal prosecution without a good faith belief that 
charges are warranted may implicate a number of disciplinary rules.  See supra note 
290 and accompanying text.  The Standards explain that a lawyer’s commission of 
multiple offenses is an aggravating factor in the determination of the appropriate 
sanction, thus possibly increasing the potential for disbarment.  STANDARDS FOR 
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 9.22 (1986). 
 394 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 9.22 (1986). 
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client—a person who may be particularly vulnerable to emotional dis-
tress given the special relationship of trust created by the attorney-
client relationship
395
—may be considered an aggravating factor in the 
outrageousness determination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By design, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
is reserved for the most egregious of misconduct, conduct that is 
beyond all bounds of decency so as to be regarded as intolerable in a 
civilized society.  By design, disbarment is a sanction that is reserved 
for the most egregious of lawyer misconduct, conduct that is utterly 
intolerable within the legal profession.  Realistically, courts will never 
be able to adequately define the concept of extreme and outrageous 
conduct for purposes of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims.  Clearer standards are, however, within the courts’ reach in 
some instances. 
Given the crucial role lawyers, as public citizens, play in the ad-
ministration of justice, conduct that warrants disbarment is conduct 
that cannot be tolerated in a civilized society.  By linking the stan-
dards for disbarment with the standard for extreme and outrageous 
conduct, courts can provide courts and litigants with greater clarity as 
to the permissible bounds of conduct.  In the process, they may also 
help promote public confidence that lawyers who engage in a wide 
departure from the standards established to protect the public are ul-
timately held to the same standards as non-lawyers for purposes of 
civil liability. 
 
 
 395 See People v. Rhodes, 107 P.3d 1177, 1183 (Colo. 2005) (noting “the vulnera-
bility of any client who depends upon his/her attorney to act with integrity in their 
affairs” and considering it an aggravating factor in imposing discipline).  But courts 
may be hesitant to assign much weight to this factor, due to the fact that “presumably 
clients will usually be in a trust relationship with their attorneys.”  In re Johnson, 826 
P.2d 186, 193 (Wash. 1992).   
